CIPP/US: the whole exam on one page
Every exam-relevant U.S. privacy law, regulator, threshold, opt-in/opt-out rule, distinction and landmark case for the IAPP CIPP/US - condensed into one scannable page. Skim it to see everything at once; use the full study notes and the practice exam to go deeper.
Introduction to Privacy
What privacy is
- 1890 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (Harvard Law Review) - defined privacy as "the right to be let alone."
- Terminology by region: U.S. = "privacy law" (also data/information privacy); EU = "data protection law." Same field.
Four classes of privacy (I-B-T-C)
| Class | Focus / typical invasion |
|---|---|
| Information | Handling of records (financial, medical, internet) - the book's main focus |
| Bodily | The physical being - genetic/drug testing, body cavity searches |
| Territorial | A person's environment (home/work) - video surveillance, ID checks |
| Communications | Means of correspondence - mail, phone, email interception |
I-B-T-C = Information, Bodily, Territorial, Communications. Same fact pattern can hit two classes: a drug test (bodily) whose results are then sold (information).
Historical origins
- 1361 Justices of the Peace Act (England) - arrest of "peeping Toms" and eavesdroppers; 1765 Lord Camden barred warrantless home searches.
- U.S. Constitution (1789): does NOT contain the word "privacy" - inferred from 3rd (quartering), 4th (search warrants), 5th (self-incrimination), 14th (due process) Amendments.
- California Constitution: EXPRESSLY guarantees privacy, added by ballot measure November 1974 (Art. 1, Sec. 1).
- 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1950 European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 (private life, home, correspondence).
U.S. Constitution = privacy implied. California Constitution = privacy explicit (1974 ballot). Don't swap them.
Fair Information Practices (FIPs / FIPPs)
Since the 1970s, the main way to organize rights and responsibilities. Four categories:
| Category | Principles |
|---|---|
| Rights of individuals | Notice; choice and consent; data subject access |
| Controls on the information | Information security; information quality |
| Information life cycle | Collection; use and retention; disclosure |
| Management | Management and administration; monitoring and enforcement |
FIP codifications - the framework table
| Framework / year | What it does | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|
| HEW Code (1973), U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare | Foundation of today's FIPs; five requirements | No secret recordkeeping systems; access; no new-purpose use without consent; correction; reliability |
| OECD Guidelines (1980, updated 2013) | Most widely recognized FIP framework; eight principles | Endorsed by the FTC. Ends with the Accountability principle (controller answers for the rest) |
| Convention 108 (1981), Council of Europe | Binding treaty - signatory states must enact data protection in domestic law | Covers special categories of data; updated as 108+ (2018) to align with GDPR. U.S. is only an observer, not expected to ratify |
| APEC Privacy Framework (2004, updated 2015) | 21 Pacific members; nine principles mirroring OECD but more explicit on exceptions | Nonbinding agreement (unlike EU). 1st principle = Preventing Harm. Led to CBPR and the 2022 Global CBPR Forum |
| Madrid Resolution (2009) | Uniform principles + facilitate international data flows | Approved by data protection commissioners, NOT governments |
Collection Limitation, Data Quality, Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness, Individual Participation, Accountability.
IT and the rise of data protection law - two firsts in 1970
| First | Detail |
|---|---|
| World's first modern data protection law | Hesse, Germany (1970) - reaction to Third Reich abuses |
| First U.S. national privacy law | Fair Credit Reporting Act / FCRA (1970) - sectoral, consumer credit only |
Context: 1960s mainframes drove surveillance fears (Orwell's 1984, "Big Brother").
Categories of data
- Personal information / PII
- Data that identifies an individual; applies to both electronic and paper records.
- Sensitive personal information
- Subset needing extra safeguards: SSNs, financial info, driver's license numbers, health information.
- Nonpersonal (deidentified / anonymized)
- Identifiers removed; privacy laws generally do not apply.
- Pseudonymized
- Held under codes - only temporarily nonpersonal and reversible (can reidentify).
Anonymized = permanent, out of scope. Pseudonymized = reversible, can reidentify (e.g., drug-trial codes). Don't equate them.
The personal / nonpersonal line - IP addresses
| Regime | IP address treated as... |
|---|---|
| European Union | Personal data (identifiable) |
| U.S. agencies under the Privacy Act | NOT covered |
| U.S. FTC (health-breach context) | Personal information |
Static IPs and IPv6 push the line toward "identifiable."
Sources of personal information
| Source | Definition / example |
|---|---|
| Public records | Held by government, available to public - deeds, court filings |
| Publicly available | Broadly accessible - phone book, newspapers, search engines |
| Nonpublic | Restricted by law/custom - medical, financial, adoption records |
Same name and address can be all three at once - handling depends on the source.
Processing and data roles
- Processing
- Almost anything done with data - collect, store, use, disclose, combine, erase, destroy.
- Data subject
- The individual the data is about.
- Data controller
- Decides how and why data is processed - focus of most obligations.
- Data processor
- Acts on controller's behalf; "business associate" under HIPAA. Cannot process beyond what the controller permits.
Sources of privacy protection (4)
- Markets - consumer/brand pressure
- Technology - e.g., encryption, works even where law/markets are weak
- Law - traditional approach
- Self-/co-regulation - policies, industry codes
Who legislates (defines rules), who enforces (initiates action - DPAs, agencies, individuals), who adjudicates (decides violations).
Models of data protection
| Model | How it works | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|
| Comprehensive (EU) | Government rules across public + private sectors, overseen by a DPA | Adopted to (1) remedy past injustices (Germany/Nazi-Stasi), (2) ensure EU consistency / GDPR adequacy, (3) promote e-commerce. Critics: one-size-fits-all, may slow innovation |
| Sectoral (U.S.) | Separate laws per industry (credit, health, video, finance) | No single DPA; suffers gaps and overlaps |
| Co-regulatory (Australia; U.S. COPPA) | Industry codes backed by government law | FTC-approved COPPA codes can satisfy the statute |
| Self-regulatory (U.S.) | Codes with no general data protection law - PCI DSS, seal programs | Criticized on adequacy and weak enforcement |
| Technology-based | Tools (e.g., provider encryption) reduce reliance on administrative measures | - |
Gap: drones unregulated until Congress acts; HITECH (2009) filled a gap by adding breach notice for personal-health-record vendors not covered by HIPAA. Overlap: a HIPAA provider can be enforced by HHS under HIPAA or the FTC for unfair and deceptive practices.
Seal programs (self-regulation) - FTC-recognized COPPA seals: CARU, ESRB, iKeepSafe, kidSAFE, PRIVO, TrustArc.
U.S. Legal Framework
Three branches and sources of law
| Branch | Role | Who |
|---|---|---|
| Legislative | Makes laws | Congress (House + Senate); can override vetoes, Senate confirms appointees |
| Executive | Enforces laws | President, cabinet, federal agencies (e.g. FTC); president has veto + appoints judges |
| Judicial | Interprets laws / rules on constitutionality | Federal courts |
When Congress delegates authority, an agency can make rules (legislative), investigate/enforce (executive), and adjudicate disputes (judicial) - all at once.
Sources of U.S. law: constitutions (federal + state), legislation, case law, contract law, tort law, agency regulations, consent decrees. A single privacy obligation can come from more than one. (Voluntary self-regulatory codes are NOT a primary source.)
Constitutions and privacy
- U.S. Constitution (1787) never uses the word "privacy." The Fourth Amendment limits government searches.
- Supreme Court recognized a privacy right via a penumbra of unenumerated rights + due process.
- Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health (2022) overturned Roe v. Wade; said to be limited to abortion but raises concern for other penumbra-based rights.
- State constitutions may grant stronger rights; California lists privacy as inalienable; 11 state constitutions expressly recognize privacy.
Legislation and preemption
Both Congress and states legislate. Under the Tenth Amendment, powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states. Key question: does federal law preempt state law (ceiling) or set a floor states may exceed?
| Law | Effect on state law |
|---|---|
| HIPAA Privacy Rule | FLOOR - states MAY pass stricter rules |
| CAN-SPAM Act (commercial email) | CEILING - federal PREEMPTS stricter state law |
HIPAA allows stricter state laws; CAN-SPAM preempts them.
Case law, common law, contract, tort
- Case law
- Final judicial decisions used as precedent.
- Stare decisis
- "Let the decision stand" - following precedent (can change over time).
- Common law
- Principles built up in judicial decisions (vs. statute); long protected doctor-patient and attorney-client confidentiality without statutes.
Contract needs offer + acceptance + consideration (no consideration = no contract). Counteroffer ends the original offer. Used for vendor data/security/breach terms.
If a consumer gives data relying on the company's promise in its notice, the privacy notice may itself be a contract; breaking it = breach.
Torts (civil wrongs), three categories:
| Category | Test | Privacy example |
|---|---|---|
| Intentional | Knew/should have known harm would result | Stealing personal info |
| Negligent | Conduct unreasonably unsafe | Inadequate security controls |
| Strict liability | Damage regardless of carelessness | Product liability |
Privacy torts date to the 1890s: intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, right of publicity. Often met with a First Amendment free-speech defense; courts are not uniform (unsettled).
Regulations, guidance, consent decrees
- Statutes can direct agencies (e.g. FTC and FCC) to issue rules with compliance force - e.g. CAN-SPAM (2003) rules on the opt-out mechanism.
- Agency opinions guide interpretation but don't necessarily carry the weight of law; informal channels (reports, speeches, testimony) show mindset and enforcement priorities, not requirements.
- Consent decree: judge-approved settlement to stop alleged illegal activity, typically without admitting guilt; once approved has the effect of a court decision. FTC has used many (e.g. COPPA), usually requiring payment to the government + future compliance.
Key definitions
- Person
- Any entity with legal rights - natural (individual) or legal (corporation).
- Jurisdiction
- Court needs both subject-matter (type of dispute) and personal (over parties) jurisdiction.
- Private right of action
- A harmed individual can sue the violator directly.
| Authority | Meaning | FTC example |
|---|---|---|
| General | Blanket authority over a field | Unfair/deceptive trade practices |
| Specific | Targeted by legislation | Enforcing COPPA |
An agency can have general AND specific authority at the same time.
Notice, choice, access
- Notice = description of practices; serves consumer education + corporate accountability. For most industries, notice promises are enforceable by the FTC and the states.
- Privacy notice (external, to consumers) vs privacy policy (internal standards).
- Access = view (and often update/correct) data held; common where info drives substantive decisions (e.g. credit reports).
| Model | Mechanism | If silent (no answer) |
|---|---|---|
| Opt-in | Affirmative "yes" | Info NOT shared |
| Opt-out | Implied unless objects | Info IS shared |
Regulatory authorities and self-regulation
- FTC - general authority over unfair/deceptive practices (incl. deception actions for broken privacy promises) + specific authority (children's privacy, marketing).
- Sector regulators: banking (CFPB, Federal Reserve, OCC), FCC, DOT, HHS Office of Civil Rights (health).
- Department of Commerce has NO privacy regulatory authority but often leads executive-branch privacy policy.
- State attorneys general enforce, often under state unfair/deceptive-practices laws.
- Under the CPRA, California created the CPPA - first U.S. agency dedicated to a state comprehensive law (like European DPAs).
- Self-regulation: NAI, Association of National Advertisers (formerly DMA), CARU; some government rules expect companies to enroll.
Six keys to understanding any law
- Who is covered? (scope)
- What information/uses are covered? (scope)
- What is required/prohibited? (how to comply)
- Who enforces? (risk)
- What if you don't comply? (risk)
- Why does it exist? (spirit/trends)
Worked example: California SB 1386 (breach notification)
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who | Entities doing business in California that own/license computerized personal info |
| What | Name + unencrypted SSN, CA ID, driver's license, or financial account/card + access code |
| Required | Disclose breach to affected CA residents "as expediently as possible" |
| Who enforces | California AG + private right of action |
| Why | Prevent identity theft - first U.S. breach-notification law |
Databases with only names/addresses or only encrypted data are NOT covered. Also: good-faith employee acquisition (if not used/disclosed) is exempt, and notice may be delayed at law enforcement's request.
Technological Aspects of Privacy
This chapter is mostly technology, not law - but the exam tests how laws and cases attach to that technology. Watch for the laws/cases woven in: CAN-SPAM, TCPA, CIPA, COPPA, CPRA, HIPAA, GDPR and Carpenter v. United States.
How the internet and web work
- TCP establishes a reliable connection and breaks data into packets; IP sets packet format and addressing (unique IP address). Data moves by packet switching - packets routed independently, reassembled in order. Header routes; payload is content.
- Internet is broader than the web (also email, IP telephony, file sharing, IoT). HTTP/HTML (Berners-Lee, CERN) drive the web; HTTPS encrypts the connection. XML describes the data; HTML describes display.
- URL = protocol + www + domain + top-level domain (.com/.org/.gov/.edu/country code). URLs are a subset of URIs.
HTML = how content displays; XML = the data itself (enables automated high-volume processing). Classic swap on the exam.
Infrastructure: gateways, IPs, architecture, cloud
| Component | Privacy point |
|---|---|
| Proxy server | Gateway; outside site sees only proxy IP; logs, filters malware, caches |
| VPN | Encrypts user-to-server traffic; masks content + destination from the local ISP |
| TLS | Secures user-server link against eavesdropping; successor to SSL |
| ISP | Connects users; assigns static (fixed) or dynamic IPs |
| Web server log | Auto-record of requests (IP, time, URL, browser/OS); can wrongly capture passwords |
A static or persistent dynamic IP durably links to a device. The EU (and some regulators) treat IP addresses as personal information; others do not.
- Client-server: front end (HTML/CSS/JS) vs back end (databases). Separating them contains a breach. Thick client processes offline; thin client relies on remote processing.
- Cloud: on-demand computing vs on-premises.
| Model | Delivers | Customer control |
|---|---|---|
| SaaS | Vendor-managed apps in browser | Lowest |
| PaaS | Dev framework/components | Medium |
| IaaS | Raw compute/network/storage | Highest (customer manages PI databases) |
- Edge computing: processes data at the network periphery (driven by IoT) to cut data-center cost and latency.
Email, texts and the laws on marketing messages
| Protocol | Note |
|---|---|
| SMTP | Sends email |
| IMAP | Leaves mail on server; multi-device sync (overtaking POP) |
| POP | Deletes mail from server |
| SMS | 160-char limit; works over cell without internet |
| OTT (iMessage, Signal, WhatsApp) | Internet-based; can offer end-to-end encryption |
CAN-SPAM = commercial email (honor opt-outs). TCPA = marketing via text. Don't swap them.
Tracking, monitoring and surveillance
- Deep packet inspection: a node reads beyond the header (malware scanning, data-leak prevention, ad targeting, censorship - China's Great Firewall). Effective encryption (HTTPS, encrypted email) defeats it (HTTPS/encrypted email surged after the 2013 Snowden disclosures).
- Packet sniffing: captures unencrypted Wi-Fi traffic. Defenses: encrypted Wi-Fi (per-user key), VPN (also covers the ISP), HTTPS.
- HTTP cookies exist because HTTP is stateless. A domain can only read cookies it set.
| Cookie | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Session | Lasts until browser closes |
| Persistent | Saved indefinitely; recognizes return visits |
| First-party | Set by the site visited |
| Third-party | Set by another company (ad/social network) |
- First-party data: cookies, UGC, and terms of use. Cookie consent covers only setting cookies; broad rights (selling data, location) come from the terms of use. In CA + EU, give notice before setting cookies.
- Data brokers: obtain, cleanse, license data; scrutinized by the FTC (market >$250B).
- Third-party cookie decline: CPRA (effective January 2023) requires notice + an OPT-OUT for third-party cookies (US opt-out, not EU opt-in). By end-2022, Edge, Firefox, Safari blocked them by default; Chrome "in process."
- Email open tracking: a tracking pixel loads on open - read in plain text to defeat it.
- Cross-device: deterministic (same login) vs probabilistic (inferred from IP, cookies, location, behavior).
| Phishing variant | Distinguishing feature |
|---|---|
| Spear phishing | Tailored to a specific individual (e.g. "from your boss") |
| Whaling | Spear phishing aimed at C-suite/celebrities/politicians |
| Smishing | Via SMS text |
| Vishing | Via fraudulent voice call/message |
For phishing that slips past filters, the principal defense is user training. Whether software is spyware turns largely on the user's intent and knowledge (same remote-screen tool = tech support, or spyware without consent). Keylogging is a form of spyware.
Location, sensors and the cases/laws
- Location tech: cell-tower/Wi-Fi triangulation, GPS, photo metadata (auto-stored location).
- Sensors: a RAT (remote access trojan) can hijack camera/mic and disable the in-use light.
Carpenter v. United States: police need a warrant for long-term tracking of movements (short periods - holders may respond voluntarily). COPPA includes location in personal data; state laws treat location as sensitive.
Government video surveillance is generally legal in the US except where there's a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g. a bathroom). Wiretap laws restrict secret audio surveillance.
Monitoring by authority: US employers may generally monitor internet use/emails on company networks/devices. CIPA requires public schools and libraries to install content filters. Ability to monitor does not make it legal or ethical.
Deidentification
| Concept | Definition / exam point |
|---|---|
| Anonymization | Removes identifiability; falls outside GDPR |
| Pseudonymization | Masks identity with a unique code; GDPR still treats it as personal data |
| Strong identifier | SSN, passport number - identifies alone |
| Weak / quasi-identifier | Must combine with other data; e.g. date of birth (Latanya Sweeney re-identified the MA governor via ZIP + DOB + gender) |
| Technique | How |
|---|---|
| Suppression | Remove identifying values |
| Generalization | Broaden detail (year not full DOB; municipality not GPS) |
| Noise addition | Swap similar-but-different values, preserving statistics (e.g. averages) |
- Differential privacy: math guarantee that the result yields essentially the same inference whether or not any individual's data is included; used in parts of the 2020 Census (dropped in 2022 for complex datasets).
- Linked vs linkable (FTC, Ramirez 2016): PII = data reasonably linkable to a person/computer/device (incl. device IDs, MAC, static IP, loyalty numbers).
| Standard | Requirement |
|---|---|
| HIPAA - Safe Harbor | Remove 18 identifiers (ZIP ≤ first 3 digits) |
| HIPAA - Expert Determination | Expert documents very small re-identification risk |
| FTC 3-part "not reasonably linkable" | (1) reasonable deidentification measures; (2) public commitment not to re-identify; (3) contractually bar downstream recipients (FTC warned 2022 "anonymous" claims are often deceptive) |
Encryption, hashing and signatures
- Encryption = plaintext to ciphertext via a key; protects in transit (man-in-the-middle), at rest, in use. Under most breach laws, encryption at rest creates an exception from the duty to report a breach.
| Approach | Keys / trade-off |
|---|---|
| Symmetric | One shared key; fast, but Alice must securely share it with Bob |
| Asymmetric | Public + private pair; scales (encrypt with recipient's public key); basis for certificates |
- CA validates identity and issues digitally signed certificates linking a person to a public key; PKI is the surrounding system.
- Hashing = one-way (irreversible); used for pseudonyms + integrity. Unsalted hashes of short values (SSNs) can be defeated by lookup tables - add salt.
- Digital signature: Alice signs with her private key; Bob verifies it's unchanged with her public key.
Cybersecurity foundations
First approximation: privacy decides which uses are authorized; security prevents unauthorized access. Security adds integrity + availability beyond the confidentiality it shares with privacy.
- CIA triad: Confidentiality (no unauthorized access), Integrity (not improperly altered), Availability (accessible when needed - ransomware hits this).
- NIST CSF (2014): guidance, not law. Five Core Functions run concurrently: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover.
| STRIDE | Threat |
|---|---|
| S | Spoofing (undermines authentication) |
| T | Tampering (alters hardware/software) |
| R | Repudiation (failing to track actions) |
| I | Information disclosure |
| D | Denial of service (DDoS makes service inoperable) |
| E | Elevation of privilege (up to root) |
- Zero trust: trust no actor inside or outside the perimeter; verify everything, encrypt all traffic.
- Least privilege via role-based access controls - often required by the HIPAA Security Rule. Plus defense in depth and security by default.
Privacy by design embeds privacy from the onset and is legally required in California and the EU. But most encryption is cracked through implementation mistakes, not algorithm flaws - technical measures need organizational measures (limiting employee access) too.
Information & Privacy Risk Management
The Business Case for Privacy
- Compliance is costly (over $1M/yr per company on GDPR after 2018; ITIF: a 50-state patchwork could cost ~$100B/yr), but mishandling data costs more - IBM 2022 average breach over $4M (higher in health/finance).
- Sensitive data (medical, financial, children's) held to a higher bar.
- Trust drives revenue: Cisco - ~75% of consumers won't buy from a business they distrust with data; Edelman - ethics matter more than competence. Equifax (~150M affected) regained near-pre-breach trust within a year.
- Surveillance capitalism
- Zuboff's term for collecting data to influence behavior.
- Duty of loyalty
- Proposed federal-bill duty to act in data subjects' best interests.
Information Management and Privacy Team Roles
Run under a senior leader (the CPO); mixes legal, IT, marketing, HR skills. Westin split the public into three attitude groups: fundamentalists (strong protectors), unconcerned (low worry), and pragmatists (largest, context-dependent, trade privacy for benefit).
| Role | Core focus |
|---|---|
| Chief privacy officer (CPO) | Leadership; develops/implements data-processing policies; can drive processing decisions |
| Data protection officer (DPO) | More common in Europe; ensures legal compliance; must stay independent - not involved in processing decisions, no conflicting duties |
| Privacy engineer | Compliance through technical processes (newer role) |
| Privacy manager | Mid-level; develops, maintains, enforces policies |
| Privacy analyst | Often entry-level; assesses business-unit ops, builds policies/trainings |
Informal: privacy champions (advocates), first responders (front-line during incidents).
CPO = leadership that can drive decisions. DPO = independent assurance role - cannot make processing decisions or hold conflicting duties (e.g., head of marketing analytics cannot be DPO).
Data Life Cycle, Inventory, Classification, Mapping
- Data life cycle: Create → Store → Share/Use → Archive → Delete. Retention/destruction obligations (state data destruction laws, Ch.7) sit at the end.
- Data inventory: document all PI collected/stored/used/disclosed (customer and employee). Documented inventory reduces penalty severity in enforcement; legally required under the GLBA Safeguards Rule (Ch.9).
- Classification by sensitivity sets access clearance + protection; segregating sensitive data limits the blast radius of a breach and over-broad access.
| Mapping approach | Description |
|---|---|
| Top-down | For regulatory purposes; often starts with the GDPR-required RoPA (purpose, recipients, retention, safeguards) |
| Bottom-up | Data assets → inventory/classification → processes (can use RoPA) → data lineage (source, critical data, how sets are aggregated) |
RoPA is one specific GDPR-mandated artifact; a broader data map merely starts from or incorporates it.
Data Accountability - Controllers, Processors, Encryption
| Term | Meaning / analogue |
|---|---|
| Controller | Determines purposes and means of processing |
| Processor | Processes on the controller's behalf; usually signs a contract to meet controller's guarantees |
| Processor analogues | HIPAA business associate (PHI); GLBA service provider (financial info) |
- Limited retention cuts breach risk; some laws require deletion after a period or when purpose ends.
- Data owner assigns sensitivity (confidential, proprietary, sensitive, restricted, public).
Under many breach-notification laws, no notice is required if the lost PI is sufficiently encrypted - a key driver of encryption at rest and in transit (HTTPS).
The Privacy Program - Four Business Risks
| Risk | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Legal | Comply with law and contracts (e.g., PCI DSS) or face litigation / multi-year consent decrees |
| Reputational | Harm from announcing but not following policies; enforcement particularly by the FTC |
| Operational | Must be efficient; overly heavy-handed programs block beneficial PI uses (personalization, fraud) |
| Strategic | Earn a return on information/technology investments amid evolving regulation |
Framework steps: develop → implement → metrics, beginning with a privacy mission statement/vision. Compliance metrics = data subject requests, disclosures, incidents, employees trained, PIA metrics. Beyond compliance = ROI, business resilience, program maturity, trend analysis, resource use.
Privacy Operational Life Cycle (A-P-S-R)
| Stage | Key activities |
|---|---|
| Assess | Baseline; evaluate processors/third parties; identify operational risks |
| Protect | Review access/technical controls and incident response; embed privacy in functions (HR) |
| Sustain | Monitor compliance + regulatory change; audit; train employees/management/contractors |
| Respond | Support consumer rights (access, redress, correction, erasure); handle complaints/appeals/incidents |
Privacy Policy vs Privacy Notice
| Aspect | Policy | Notice |
|---|---|---|
| Direction | Internal | External |
| Audience | Employees/contractors | Customers, users (sometimes employees) |
| Purpose | Guide PI handling | Transparency - treated as a promise |
Violating a promise communicated in the notice exposes a company to a deceptive-practice action by the FTC or a state attorney general.
Updating: needs legal review + executive approval; review at least annually; use revision dates/version numbers and keep old versions (use data only per the notice in effect at collection).
FTC: get express affirmative consent (opt-in) before a material retroactive change. A material change at minimum = sharing data with third parties after promising at collection not to.
Delivering Notices
- Layered notice: short top layer + linked full notice (good for small mobile screens).
- Just-in-time notice: at or before the point of collection.
- Privacy dashboard: summary plus user control.
- GLBA requires financial institutions to deliver the notice annually, with clear opt-out rights. HIPAA mandates training for all covered-entity employees.
Consent Models: Opt-In / Opt-Out / No Option
| Model | Examples |
|---|---|
| Opt-in (affirmative/express) | COPPA (verifiable parental consent before child's PI); HIPAA before disclosing PHI; FCRA before credit report to employer/lender; EU/GDPR marketing; sensitive data (geolocation) |
| Opt-out (consumer choice) | GLBA before transferring PI to unaffiliated third party; VPPA before sharing rental data; CAN-SPAM marketing email; Do Not Call telemarketing |
| No option (commonly accepted) | Order fulfillment (shipping, card processing); internal ops, fraud prevention, legal compliance, first-party marketing |
COPPA / HIPAA disclosure / FCRA credit-report release = opt-in. GLBA third-party transfer / VPPA / CAN-SPAM = opt-out. Opt-out is less stringent but still an enforceable promise. Double opt-in = interest + email confirmation before marketing.
Managing Preferences and Dark Patterns
- Channel symmetry: the marketing channel should be the opt-out channel - CAN-SPAM requires an online opt-out for email (mail/phone-only not acceptable).
- Linking: under GLBA a bank must honor an opt-out across all communications regardless of media used to request it.
- Scope: third-party sharing needs opt-out; affiliate sharing does not. Third-party vendors must honor preferences given to the first organization; consent must be revocable.
- Dark patterns (interfaces that subvert user autonomy) are increasingly barred as valid consent.
Consumer Rights and Requests
- Rights: access, correction (rectification), deletion, portability, against automated decision-making, nondiscrimination - with defined response periods and a right to appeal (then complain to a regulator).
- Statutory access: FCRA (credit reports + rectification), HIPAA (medical records, disputes noted), GDPR, and the Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (qualifying non-U.S. individuals vs a U.S. agency). Absent a statute, access derives from OECD Guidelines / APEC Principles.
Privacy Risk Management, PIAs, Vendors
- Privacy risk = likelihood individuals experience problems from processing × the impact if they occur (NIST framing).
- Privacy harms: loss of self-determination (autonomy, exclusion, loss of liberty, physical harm), discrimination, loss of trust, economic loss.
- PIA (≈ GDPR DPIA): ensures legal conformity, determines risks/effects, evaluates protections; usually combines risk assessment + treatment. The privacy risk assessment weighs privacy impact × likelihood given controls.
Vendor/third-party risk: companies remain responsible for vendor actions; policy claims apply to third parties. Contract protections: confidentiality, no further use, subcontractor flow-down, prompt breach notice, security provisions, return/deletion at end. Due diligence: reputation, finances, SOC 2 (AICPA), disposal per the FACTA Disposal Rule, PCI DSS.
Software vendor to 18,000+ orgs; in 2020 inadvertently pushed malicious code in updates, creating backdoors used to spy on Fortune 500 firms and U.S. agencies - the classic vendor-risk lesson.
Information Security - CIA Triad and Controls
- Confidentiality
- Access limited to authorized parties.
- Integrity
- Data is authentic and complete.
- Availability
- Data accessible to the authorized as needed.
| Control type | Examples |
|---|---|
| Physical | Locks, cameras, fences |
| Administrative | Incident response procedures, training |
| Technical | Firewalls, antivirus, access logs |
Security protects information from unauthorized access; privacy decides what use/disclosure is authorized and adds the individual's right to control. Security is necessary but not sufficient for privacy. NIST Cybersecurity Framework: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover.
Data Breach Readiness Assessment
Forward-looking gauge of likelihood and severity of a personal data breach. Factors: type/nature of data (esp. sensitive PI); whether safeguards like encryption or pseudonymization were applied (lower assessed severity); effect on data subjects; potential malicious use; potential substantial physical damage.
Global Perspective and Cross-Border Transfers
160+ nations have significant privacy laws; the GDPR draws the most attention - fines based on worldwide revenue. GDPR-similar laws (China, India, Brazil, Japan, South Korea) are not identical - comply with each regime. Data localization (store/process within borders) is a rising trend.
| Trust mechanism | Description |
|---|---|
| Domestic / unilateral | Pre-authorization safeguards: adequacy determinations and/or SCCs |
| Multilateral | OECD Privacy Guidelines; APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules; Council of Europe Convention 108 / 108+ |
| Trade agreements | Increasingly include data-flow provisions (still allow public-policy restrictions) |
| Standards / technology | ISO standards and PETs (privacy-enhancing technologies) |
Federal & State Regulators and Enforcement
The U.S. regulatory model
- Sectoral, not comprehensive - privacy regulated by industry (medical, financial, education), no single omnibus federal law.
- The FTC is the lead privacy enforcer, filling consumer-protection gaps under Section 5.
- All 50 states have UDAP statutes (Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices) similar to the FTC Act; absence of a federal comprehensive law makes state enforcement more important.
Three types of legal action
| Type | Who brings it | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Civil litigation | Private plaintiff (sometimes via a private right of action) | Money damages or injunction |
| Criminal prosecution | Govt - federally the DOJ (sole federal criminal enforcer); states use AGs/DAs | Imprisonment + criminal fines |
| Administrative enforcement | An agency (e.g. FTC) under the APA | Adjudication before an ALJ, appealable to federal court |
FCRA has a private right of action - a consumer can sue directly, no agency referral needed.
Federal sectoral regulators (who enforces what)
| Law / sector | Lead agency |
|---|---|
| HIPAA (health/PHI) | OCR within HHS |
| GLBA (financial/NPI) | CFPB + bank regulators (Fed, OCC) |
| FERPA (education records) | Dept. of Education |
| TCPA (telecom/telemarketing) | FCC |
| ADA / antidiscrimination (workplace) | EEOC |
| Privacy Act of 1974 (federal agencies + contractors) | OMB (lead interpreter) |
The FTC may have overlapping responsibility, but match the statute to its primary regulator - don't pick the FTC for sector-specific statutes. AI angle: OCR/HHS addresses improper PHI collection by AI; EEOC addresses algorithmic hiring discrimination.
Other actors: DOS (international), DOC (federal privacy policy, EU-U.S. data flows), DOT/FAA/NHTSA (drones, connected cars), IRS/Treasury + FinCEN (tax records, money laundering), DHS (E-Verify, TSA, ICE), DOE (Smart Grid).
FTC Section 5 - the cornerstone
- Independent agency (chair + 4 commissioners); founded 1914 (antitrust), consumer-protection mission added 1938.
- Section 5 bars "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" - the single most important U.S. privacy provision (never mentions privacy explicitly).
Section 5 does NOT cover: nonprofits, banks / federally regulated financial institutions, and common carriers (transportation + communications). The exam will hand you one of these and tempt the FTC answer.
Landmark cases
| Case | Court / year | Holding |
|---|---|---|
| FTC v. Wyndham | 3rd Cir., 2015 | Section 5 unfairness extends to cybersecurity; FTC may require more than minimum standards |
| FTC v. LabMD | 11th Cir., 2018 | Recognized authority but vacated the order as too vague ("mandates a complete overhaul" without saying how) |
| AMG Capital Mgmt v. FTC | SCOTUS, 2021 | FTC cannot get monetary relief (damages) under Section 13(b) |
| West Virginia v. EPA | SCOTUS, 2022 | Major questions doctrine - may narrow FTC rulemaking authority |
FTC enforcement tools
| Provision | Type | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Section 5(l) | Administrative | Cease-and-desist order; civil penalties for later violations of an order |
| Section 13(b) | Judicial | Historically equitable money relief (restitution, disgorgement) - now limited by AMG |
| Section 19 | Judicial | Court relief, but only after a final cease-and-desist order |
- FTC cannot itself assess civil penalties; seeks them in federal court, up to $50,120 per violation.
- Rulemaking: UDAP trade-rules use the slower Magnuson-Moss (Section 18) process, NOT ordinary APA notice-and-comment; must show the practice is prevalent + unfair/deceptive + economic effects.
Most FTC privacy matters end in a consent decree: respondent does not admit fault but promises to change practices. Decrees are public, often require privacy programs/audits, and monetary fines are far easier to assess in federal court once a decree exists and is later violated (monitored by the BCP Enforcement Division with the DOJ).
Deceptive vs unfair practices
- Deceptive practice
- A material statement or omission likely to mislead reasonable consumers - includes breaking privacy-notice promises.
- Unfair practice
- Three-part test: (1) substantial injury (not speculative); (2) not reasonably avoidable; (3) not outweighed by countervailing benefits. No deceptive statement required.
| Case | Year | Theory / key point |
|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Deceptive - $5B fine (then largest); violated its 2012 consent order; board-level privacy accountability | |
| Everalbum | 2021 | Deceptive - auto-enabled facial recognition (said opt-in); algorithmic disgorgement (delete models from improperly obtained data) |
| Equifax | 2019 | Unfair - 2017 breach (~150M); settled w/ FTC + CFPB + 50 states; $300M consumer fund, $175M states, $100M CFPB penalty; 20-yr security program |
| Uber | 2018 | Unfair - concealed 2016 breach + ransom; first executive criminal prosecution (security chief convicted 2022) |
Algorithmic disgorgement is non-monetary, so it survives AMG - increasingly used for AI.
FTC authority beyond Section 5
| Law | FTC role | Key detail |
|---|---|---|
| COPPA | Rulemaking + enforcement | Children under 13; requires notice + verifiable parental consent |
| HITECH | Shares with HHS | Breach notice for personal health record providers (even w/o govt reimbursement) |
| FCRA / FACTA | Historic, now largely CFPB | State AGs must notify the FTC before suit (FTC may intervene) |
| CAN-SPAM | Shares with FCC + state AGs | Unsolicited commercial email; FCC rules on MSCMs (commercial texts) |
Future priorities: 2023 Office of Technology; 2022 proposed commercial surveillance rules (Magnuson-Moss); 2020 data portability workshop; 2022 dark patterns report; broadened Section 5 competition vision (no separate market-power showing needed).
State enforcement
- State AGs are the primary privacy enforcers; may join federal actions under HIPAA, GLBA, and CAN-SPAM.
- All 50 states have UDAP statutes; the FTC Act does NOT preempt non-conflicting state UDAP laws. Some reach unconscionable practices; several allow private rights of action.
Comprehensive state laws by end of 2022: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Utah, Virginia. Most reference COPPA for children's consent. They exempt federal sectoral laws via:
- Entity-level exemption
- Excuses the whole entity subject to a federal law.
- Data-based exemption
- Excuses only the data regulated by that law (HIPAA, GLBA, FCRA, DPPA).
State breach, SSN, identity-theft and other laws
- California enacted the first breach law in 2002; all 50 states now have one. Many require reports to state AGs.
- Breach-law personal info = name + (1) SSN, (2) driver's license/state ID, or (3) financial account/card number - narrower than comprehensive-law definitions.
- FACTA (2003) amended FCRA and preempted many state credit-report laws, but states kept identity-theft authority; all 50 have identity-theft laws (over half allow restitution).
- Common-law privacy torts: intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name/likeness, publicity given to private life, false light.
- DPPA (1994): bars state DMVs from releasing drivers' info without permission.
COPPA protects under 13; California's Age-Appropriate Design Code Act (2022) protects under 18 (high-privacy defaults). The exam swaps these.
BIPA (Illinois, 2008): notice + informed consent for biometrics, with a private right of action driving class actions since 2015.
Self-regulation
- Spans legislation, enforcement, adjudication. Under Section 5/UDAP it is only quasi-legislative - industry writes rules but a government agency still enforces and adjudicates.
- PCI DSS = full self-regulatory system (privately drafted + enforced); penalties $5,000-$100,000 per month, can cut a merchant off from card networks.
- Privacy seals / trust marks (BBB, TrustArc) and the DAA / AdChoices icon program (choice over behavioral advertising).
State Comprehensive Privacy Laws
The U.S. has no federal comprehensive privacy law; it regulates sectorally (HIPAA, GLBA, COPPA). States filled the gap. This chapter = the five laws in effect in 2023: California (CCPA/CPRA), Colorado (CPA), Connecticut (CTDPA), Utah (UCPA), Virginia (VCDPA). California = broadest; Utah = narrowest outlier.
Federal debates: preemption and private right of action
- Preemption
- Federal statute overrides inconsistent state law (e.g. CAN-SPAM preempts state commercial-email laws).
- Private right of action
- Lets individuals sue directly rather than relying on a government enforcer.
- Data fiduciary duty
- Novel proposal: data handlers must act in good faith on behalf of consumers.
Industry = broad preemption + NO private suits. Advocates (and state governors/AGs) = narrow/no preemption + YES private suits.
California timeline (first mover)
| Law | Action | Enacted/Passed | Effective |
|---|---|---|---|
| CCPA | First state comprehensive law | 2018 | Jan 1, 2020 |
| CPRA | Amended/extended CCPA; created the CPPA | Late 2020 | Jan 1, 2023 |
The CPPA (California Privacy Protection Agency) is a dedicated regulator, viewed as California's answer to an EU DPA.
Applicability thresholds (who is a "business" / "controller")
California uses business; the other four use controller. California: $25M annual gross revenue ALONE triggers coverage.
| State | Consumer-count trigger | Revenue trigger |
|---|---|---|
| California | 100,000 consumers, OR 50% of revenue from selling OR sharing | $25M alone (standalone) |
| Colorado | 25,000 + any revenue/discount from selling | None standalone |
| Connecticut | 25,000 (excludes payment transactions) + 25% revenue from selling | None standalone |
| Virginia | 25,000 + 50% revenue from selling | None standalone |
| Utah | $25M AND (100,000 consumers OR 25,000 + 50% selling revenue) | Revenue alone NEVER enough |
1) Only California counts selling AND sharing in its 50% test (others = selling only). 2) Connecticut excludes payment transactions from its count. 3) Utah is the only state where $25M revenue alone is never sufficient - must pair with a processing threshold.
Exemptions: entity-level vs data-based
- Entity-level = whole organization exempt (e.g. nonprofits, higher ed, local government).
- Data-based = only a class of data exempt (e.g. DPPA-covered data) - the rest stays regulated.
| Exemption | States that grant it |
|---|---|
| Governments and nonprofits | All five |
| FCRA entities | All five (only universal federal exemption) |
| GLBA entities | Colorado, Connecticut, Utah, Virginia (NOT California) |
| HIPAA entities + higher ed | Connecticut, Utah, Virginia (NOT California) |
| Registered national securities associations | Colorado, Connecticut |
Under a data-based HIPAA exemption, a hospital's patient records are exempt but its HR records remain regulated. The same entity can hold exempt and regulated data at once.
Defining "consumer" and "personal information"
- All five protect state residents (not just purchasers).
- Only California includes employees; the other four exclude individuals "acting in a commercial or employment context."
- Personal information = data linkable to an individual. California uniquely adds household and employment data.
| PI exclusion | States |
|---|---|
| Deidentified data; Publicly available info | All five |
| Federally regulated data (HIPAA, GLBA, FCRA, DPPA) | All five (generally) |
| Aggregate data | California, Utah, Virginia (explicitly) |
Sensitive personal information
All five include: citizenship; genetic/biometric; physical/mental health; race/ethnicity; religion; sexual orientation. Additions:
- Children's data treated as sensitive (opt-in): Colorado, Connecticut, Virginia.
- Geolocation as sensitive: California, Connecticut, Utah, Virginia.
- California adds union membership, philosophical beliefs, content of mail/email/text.
Sale vs California's "sharing"
| "Sale" defined as | States |
|---|---|
| Monetary compensation only | Utah, Virginia |
| Any exchange for value (incl. bartering) | California, Colorado, Connecticut |
Exclusions from sale: disclosure to a processor; to fulfill a consumer-requested product/service; consumer-directed disclosures; M&A/bankruptcy asset transfers.
Only California separately regulates sharing - transfer for cross-context behavioral advertising, whether or not for money. The other four do not.
Consumer rights, timelines, and appeal
GDPR-like rights: access, correction, deletion, portability, opt-outs, against automated decisions, sensitive-data, nondiscrimination.
| State | Response time | Right to appeal? |
|---|---|---|
| Colorado / Connecticut / Virginia | 45 days (+45 if needed) | Yes |
| Utah | 45 days (+45 if needed) | No |
| California | 45 days; opt-out requests = 15 days | No |
Opt-out requests get only 15 days (not 45), and California has no explicit right to appeal (neither does Utah). Appeal = Colorado, Connecticut, Virginia only.
Access / correction / deletion + opt-outs
- Access & deletion: all five. Correction: all except Utah.
- Deletion scope: CO/CT/VA = all held data; CA/UT = only data collected from the consumer. California also must notify service providers/third parties to delete.
- Opt out of sales: all five. Opt out of sharing: California only.
- Opt out of targeting/cross-context behavioral advertising: explicit in CO/CT/UT/VA (CA likely via opt-out of sell/share).
- Right against automated decision-making: all except Utah.
Sensitive-data handling and nondiscrimination
| State | Sensitive-data mechanism |
|---|---|
| Colorado, Connecticut, Virginia | Opt-IN consent required |
| Utah | Notice + opportunity to opt OUT |
| California | Self-restrict uses OR notice + opt-out |
Nondiscrimination (no denial/different price/degraded quality for exercising rights): all five.
Notice and transparency
- Privacy notice + notice of right to opt out: all five.
- Notice at point of collection: California only.
- "Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information" link and "Limit the Use of My Personal Information" link: California only.
Children's data (age thresholds)
| State | Opt-in requirement |
|---|---|
| California | Opt-in to sell/share data of consumers under 16 |
| Connecticut | Opt-in ages 13-16 to sell/target-advertise; under-13 = sensitive |
| Colorado, Virginia | Under-13 treated as sensitive (opt-in) |
| Utah | Opt-in to process data of under 13 |
Interacts with COPPA (parental consent generally required under 13).
Purpose limits, risk assessments, security
- Purpose/processing limitation (necessary/proportionate) and risk assessments for heightened-risk processing (targeted ads, selling, sensitive data, certain profiling): California, Colorado, Connecticut, Virginia - NOT Utah.
- Reasonable administrative, technical, physical security: all five (including Utah).
Enforcement, penalties, cure periods, private action
| State | Penalty per violation | Enforcer |
|---|---|---|
| California | Up to $2,500 ($7,500 if intentional) | AG AND the CPPA |
| Virginia | Up to $7,500 | AG (sole) |
| Utah | Up to $7,500 | AG (sole) |
| Colorado | Up to $20,000 (deceptive trade practice) | AG AND local district attorneys |
| Connecticut | Up to $5,000 per willful violation | AG + Division of Consumer Protection |
| State | Cure period |
|---|---|
| California | Had one; expired |
| Colorado / Connecticut | Sunsets Dec 31, 2024 |
| Utah / Virginia | 30-day cure, no end date |
No state has a traditional private right of action. CO/CT/UT/VA = none at all. California's is limited to data breaches (and usernames/passwords) - NOT the general access/deletion/opt-out rights.
Universal opt-out mechanisms (GPC) - supplement
- Universal opt-out mechanism
- A browser/device signal opting a consumer out of sale, sharing, or targeted advertising across ALL sites at once, with no per-site request.
- Global Privacy Control (GPC)
- The leading example of such a signal.
California and Colorado have the most substantive guidance and require businesses to honor these signals. (By end of 2026, others include Texas, Montana, Delaware, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Minnesota, Maryland, Connecticut, Oregon.)
The "Do Not Sell or Share" link is exercised one site at a time; a universal signal like GPC carries the opt-out to every site. Distinct obligations - posting the link does not satisfy the duty to honor the signal.
State Breach, Security & Sectoral Laws
All 50 states have breach notification laws; many add data security and data destruction laws. There is no comprehensive federal breach law, so national companies must comply with all 50 state regimes.
A state's comprehensive privacy law and its breach law both define "personal information" but differ. Comprehensive laws limit what authorized parties do with data; breach laws target unauthorized fraud/identity theft. Do not carry one definition over to the other.
No federal breach law - the preemption fault line
- First federal bill: 2003, Senator Dianne Feinstein (CA). None has passed.
- Businesses want fewer requirements + preemption of stricter state laws; privacy advocates want a federal floor matched to the strictest states.
Anatomy of a state breach law
Three building blocks: key terms (personal info, covered entity, security breach), notification (who/when/what/how), enforcement (penalties + private rights).
- Personal information (majority)
- First name/initial + last name plus one of: SSN, driver's license/state ID, or financial account / card number (often with access code).
- ~Two-thirds of states add
- Medical/health info, biometric data, tax info, mother's maiden name. Almost all states exclude publicly available info.
- Covered entity
- Does business in-state + maintains computerized personal data. Georgia outlier: limits to information brokers only.
- Security breach
- Unauthorized access/acquisition compromising confidentiality/security/integrity, where data was not encrypted or rendered unreadable.
- Risk-of-harm analysis
- Nearly all states: skip notice if harm not reasonably likely. EXCEPT California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, Texas (no risk-of-harm).
Notification requirements
| Item | Rule / trap |
|---|---|
| Whom to notify | Affected residents = all 50 states; AG/state agency = ~2/3; nationwide CRAs = ~2/3 |
| Timing (individuals) | "As expeditiously as possible, without unreasonable delay"; common cap 45 days, but industry best practice = 30 days |
| AG notice timing | Threshold often 250-1,000 affected; Vermont = 14 business days (shortest AG); MD, NH, NJ require AG notice before individuals |
| CRA notice timing | Usually "without unreasonable delay" or defer to federal; Minnesota = 48 hours (shortest CRA) |
| Method | Default = written postal mail; email/phone only if person previously and explicitly chose it |
| Substitute notice | Large breaches (undue burden): website posting + statewide media |
| Letter content | ~half mandate content (incident, date, data types, steps, FTC/AG/CRA contacts). Massachusetts PROHIBITS describing breach nature or # affected |
| Free credit monitoring | FTC suggests 1 yr if SSNs exposed; REQUIRED (≥12 mo) only in CA, DE, MA (CA first, 2015) |
Vermont 14 business days = shortest AG timeframe. Minnesota 48 hours = shortest CRA timeframe. Classic swap trap.
Exceptions and delay
- More stringent law - e.g. HIPAA (healthcare) or GLBA Safeguards Rule (financial).
- Own compatible notice policy.
- Encryption safe harbor - all states have it, but fails if the decryption key is breached too (Illinois explicit).
- Law-enforcement delay - all states allow delay if notice would impede a criminal investigation; not permanent.
Enforcement
- All 50 states: civil penalties. ~1/3 let the AG fine, often capped per breach - $750,000 highest (Michigan).
- Nearly 15 states grant a private right of action, usually capped at actual damages + fees.
2020: CA first state to allow $100-$750 per incident statutory damages (no proof of loss) where breach resulted from failure to implement/maintain reasonable security. A 30-day cure bars statutory damages - but adopting security after the breach is NOT a cure.
State data security laws (~2/3 of states)
No federal all-industry security law; healthcare/financial sectors have federal rules, and the FTC uses Section 5 against deceptive (misrepresented) or unfair (unreasonable) security.
| Approach | ~States | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Reasonable security (no specifics) | ~20 | California AB 1950 (first state security law) |
| Prescriptive requirements | ~10 | Massachusetts (most prescriptive: encryption, access controls, training, etc.) |
| Cybersecurity safe harbor | 4 | Connecticut, Iowa, Ohio, Utah - defeats suit if safeguards existed pre-breach |
Sector overlays exist; New York has the most prominent.
State data destruction laws (~2/3 of states)
Dispose of personal info so it is no longer readable or decipherable; advances data minimization. No all-industry federal law, but the FTC Disposal Rule covers consumer reports. Common exemptions: GLBA, HIPAA, FCRA.
Sectoral and emerging state laws (supplement)
| Law / case | What it does | Enforcement / key point |
|---|---|---|
| WA My Health My Data Act (MHMDA), 2023 | Regulates consumer health data (apps/wearables) outside HIPAA; consent, separate policy, geofencing near health facilities | Private right of action (the headline difference) |
| Nevada SB 370 / Connecticut SB 3 | Consumer health data laws modeled on MHMDA | AG-only - NO private right of action |
| Illinois GIPA, 1998 | Bars conditioning employment on genetic info | Private right of action, uncapped per-violation damages; 50+ suits in 2023 |
| Federal GINA, 2008 | Protects genetic info in employment + health insurance | GIPA = older STATE law; GINA = later FEDERAL law (don't swap) |
| Vermont data broker act, 2019 | First data broker law: annual registration + security program | Registry model |
| California Delete Act, 2023 | Broker registration + centralized deletion (one request reaches all brokers) | Enforced by CPPA; TX (2023) & OR (2024) also have broker laws |
| Illinois BIPA, 2008 (amended 2024) | First US biometric law; 5-yr SOL; damages $1,000 / $5,000 per violation; 2024 = one violation per individual (not per scan) | Private right of action; Illinois v. Facebook = $650M settlement |
| Texas CUBI & Washington biometric laws | Biometric privacy | AG-only - no private right; 2024 Texas got $1.4B from Meta (largest single-state ever) |
| Colorado AI Act | Algorithmic discrimination | Enforced by AG only |
| NYC Local Law 144 | Employers using AEDTs need bias audit, publish results, notify candidates + offer alternative | Hiring/promotion tools |
| NAIC Model Bulletin on AI Systems | Insurer AI guidance: transparency, accountability, fairness, governance | Adopted by at least 11 states |
| Tilting Point Media | Misclassified children as adults, bypassed parental consent, shared kids' data via SDKs | $500,000 settlement; COPPA + CCPA + CA Age-Appropriate Design Code Act; neutral age gates + SDK transparency |
HAS it: WA MHMDA, IL GIPA, IL BIPA, CA breach statute. AG-only (no private right): NV SB 370, CT SB 3, TX CUBI, WA biometric, Colorado AI Act.
US in context: some call the US less stringent than the EU (no comprehensive federal laws), but intense US breach focus has often driven more rigorous security programs.
Medical Privacy
Health data is sensitive (body/mind, candor with doctors, anti-discrimination by employers/insurers), yet used heavily for treatment, payment, research, and quality. Key trap: health data is NOT automatically HIPAA-protected - protection depends on WHO holds it.
Major Laws at a Glance
| Law | What it does | Who enforces | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIPAA (1996) | Original goal was efficiency (electronic Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement); Congress told HHS to add privacy/security rules | OCR (within HHS); DOJ for criminal; FTC/state AGs also | Only covers covered entities + business associates; no private right of action |
| HIPAA Privacy Rule (2000, rev. 2002/2013) | Most detailed FIPPs: notices, authorizations, minimum necessary, access/amendment, safeguards, accountability | OCR | Covers ALL PHI in any form; TPO needs no authorization, most else is opt-in |
| HIPAA Security Rule (2003) | Admin/physical/technical safeguards; technology-neutral; required vs addressable specs | OCR | Covers only ePHI; uniquely handles integrity, availability, backup, disaster recovery |
| HITECH (2009) | Strengthened HIPAA; created breach notification; $19B for EHRs; rules apply directly to business associates | OCR (FTC for PHR vendors) | Breach presumed unless low-probability shown; encryption avoids liability |
| Substance Use Rule (42 CFR Part 2) | Protects patient-identifying info at federally funded substance abuse programs; written consent; no redisclosure | Reported to U.S. Attorney's Office | Criminal penalties ($500 first / $5,000 subsequent); more protective than HIPAA |
| GINA (2008) | Bars health insurers + employers from using genetic info (absent manifest disease) | (amended laws may provide one) | No private right of action; does NOT reach life insurers, mortgage lenders, schools |
| 21st Century Cures Act (2016) | Promotes EHI interoperability; bans information blocking; requires open APIs | ONC, up to $1 million | Privacy/security is a recognized exception; APIs can move data from HIPAA to non-HIPAA apps |
| FTC Act Section 5 | Unfair/deceptive practices - primary federal tool for medtech outside HIPAA | FTC | 2021 Flo Health action (shared data despite promise not to) |
| FDCA | FDA regulates medical devices by risk level; growing cybersecurity focus | FDA | AI-based SaMD more heavily regulated |
| FTC HBNR (2009) | Breach notice for identifiable health info held OUTSIDE HIPAA (apps, websites, wearables, PHRs) | FTC | No deidentified-data exemption (unlike HIPAA); notify consumers, FTC, sometimes media |
Core HIPAA Definitions
- PHI
- Individually identifiable health info held by a covered entity/business associate relating to health, care, or payment.
- ePHI
- PHI in electronic media. Paper, paper-to-paper faxes, and voice phone calls are NOT electronic media.
- Covered entity
- (1) Health care providers conducting certain electronic transactions, (2) health plans, (3) health care clearinghouses.
- Business associate
- Performs services using/disclosing PHI for a covered entity (e.g., cloud storage, billing); needs a written BAA.
- TPO
- Treatment, payment, operations - the purposes HIPAA pre-authorizes without separate authorization.
- Deidentified
- Via safe harbor (remove 18 listed elements) or expert determination; outside the Privacy Rule.
A provider who takes only cash and never bills insurance electronically is NOT a covered entity. Covered-entity status hinges on the electronic transaction, not on keeping medical records.
A wearable used under medical supervision is HIPAA-covered; the same data from a retail smartwatch goes to a maker outside HIPAA (FTC enforcement). California's CMIA can reach health websites/apps HIPAA does not.
Privacy Rule Mechanics & Exceptions
- Notices: required at first service delivery (exceptions: indirect treatment, emergencies).
- Authorizations: TPO is free; other uses need opt-in; stricter for psychotherapy notes; treatment can't be conditioned on signing. Face-to-face communications are not marketing.
- Minimum necessary: applies to all except treatment.
- Access/amendment: patient may access/copy/amend designated record set; if amendment denied, patient files a statement included in future disclosures (no lawsuit - no private right of action).
- Exceptions (disclosure without consent): public health, abuse/neglect reporting, judicial/law enforcement, research (IRB-approved or deidentified).
- Post-Dobbs: Rule permits but does NOT require law enforcement disclosures.
Security Rule Specs
- Required spec
- Must be adopted as written.
- Addressable spec
- Assess appropriateness; if declined, document why and adopt a reasonable alternative (NOT optional to ignore).
Enforcement & Penalties
- OCR civil penalties up to ~$2 million/year per violation type (Anthem $16M; Premera $6.85M; Banner Health $200K for access).
- DOJ criminal authority, prison up to 10 years.
- 2021 HIPAA Safe Harbor Law: OCR may grant leniency if recognized security practices used the prior 12 months (not automatic immunity).
- Preemption: HIPAA is a federal floor - does NOT preempt stricter state law. Watch entity-exemption vs data-exemption distinction.
HITECH Breach Notification
| Trigger | Requirement |
|---|---|
| High probability of compromise | Notify individuals within 60 days |
| Business associate discovers breach | Notify the covered entity |
| More than 500 affected | Notify HHS immediately |
| 500+ in same jurisdiction | Notify the media |
| All notice-requiring breaches | Report to HHS at least annually |
HITECH also: penalties up to $2M for willful violations (even without knowledge); criminal liability for individuals; limited data sets; cash-paying patients may restrict disclosure to health plan; EHRs may not be sold without patient consent; PHR vendors (apps/wearables) enforced by FTC.
GINA Details
- Targets genetic predisposition absent manifestation of disease; bars insurers from premium adjustments/required testing and employers from using genetic info.
- Amended ERISA (penalty $100/day, min up to $15,000), Public Health Service Act, Social Security Act, Civil Rights Act.
- Employer exceptions (inadvertent, voluntary wellness w/ authorization, FMLA, public sources, toxin monitoring, DNA QC) - info must be kept in separate confidential medical files.
- CalGINA (2011) + other states fill gaps (life insurers, lenders, housing, education).
Telemedicine (COVID-era changes)
- OCR allowed nonpublic-facing videoconferencing (secure log-in) even if not fully HIPAA-compliant - enforcement discretion, not repeal.
- CMS allowed telemedicine reimbursement; DEA suspended the Ryan Haight Act in-person exam rule for controlled substances; IMLC use grew ~50% for cross-state licensing.
2024-2025 Updates
- Tracking technologies: OCR guidance - covered entities sending PHI to third-party trackers (cookies/pixels) can be an impermissible Privacy Rule disclosure. Non-HIPAA firms still bound by FTC Act, even if a third party built the app.
- Warby Parker (Feb 2025): OCR $1.5M penalty for Security Rule failures after a 2018 credential-stuffing attack (~200,000 affected) - no risk analysis, no MFA, no log review.
- HBNR 2024 update: explicitly covers health apps; identify third parties; for 500+ affected, FTC notice simultaneous with consumer notice; electronic notice allowed.
- 42 CFR Part 2 Final Rule (Feb 8, 2024): aligns with HIPAA/HITECH - single consent for future TPO; recipients may redisclose per HIPAA; HIPAA enforcement + Breach Notification Rule apply.
- Reproductive-health Privacy Rule (2024): barred PHI disclosure for lawful reproductive care, but vacated nationwide by a Texas federal judge in June 2025.
HIPAA = covered entities/business associates only, enforced by OCR, no private right of action, federal floor (no preemption of stricter state law). Privacy Rule = all PHI; Security Rule = only ePHI.
HIPAA protections fall away once data is properly deidentified; the FTC HBNR has NO deidentified-data exemption.
Financial Privacy
The Three Pillars + Regulator
| Law | What it does | Who enforces | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|---|
| FCRA (1970) | First federal law to regulate private use of personal info; governs CRAs and consumer reports | FTC, CFPB, state AGs | Private right of action exists; statutory damages up to $1,000/violation (max $4,705 willful) |
| FACTA (2003) | Amended FCRA: card truncation, free annual report, Disposal Rule, Red Flags Rule | FTC, CFPB, banking regs | Preempts stricter state credit-reporting laws (named exceptions only) |
| GLBA (1999) | Privacy Rule + Safeguards Rule for financial institutions | Banking regs, SEC, FTC, CFPB | NO private right of action; does NOT preempt stricter state laws; uses opt-out |
| Dodd-Frank (2010) | Created the CFPB; added "abusive" standard | - | CFPB now writes rules for FCRA/FACTA and most GLBA institutions |
FACTA preempts stricter state credit-reporting laws; GLBA does NOT preempt stricter state laws. Confusing the two is the classic trap.
FCRA: Three Roles
- CRA
- Compiles/evaluates info to furnish consumer reports to third parties for a fee (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion + thousands of smaller bureaus).
- User
- Lender/insurer/employer who uses a report; must have + certify a permissible purpose and give adverse-action notice.
- Furnisher
- Lender/retailer who feeds data to CRAs; must supply accurate data and handle disputes. An entity can be both user and furnisher.
Breach of ~150M consumers was not a FCRA violation because Equifax never "furnished" the stolen data to hackers. FCRA protections attach only when a CRA furnishes a report.
CRA Duties + Obsolescence
- Provide access + dispute process (reasonable investigation); may withhold credit/risk scores.
- Ensure maximum possible accuracy.
- Drop outdated negatives: account data after 7 years; bankruptcies after 10 years.
Permissible Purpose
A user must certify the permissible purpose AND certify it won't be used for any other purpose. Purposes: written instruction of consumer; credit application/review; employment (only with written permission); insurance underwriting; legitimate business need (consumer-initiated); government license/benefit; child-support; court order/subpoena; prescreened firm offers.
Adverse Action Notices
An adverse action is any negative business/credit/employment decision. No adverse action when a creditor makes a counteroffer the consumer accepts.
| Info source | Consumer window | Provider response |
|---|---|---|
| From a CRA | Free file disclosure if requested within 60 days; right to dispute | Notice when action taken |
| Third party (non-CRA) | Written request within 60 days | Disclose within reasonable time |
| Affiliate | Written request within 60 days | Disclose within 30 days of request |
Other FCRA Rules
- Furnisher Rule: accuracy + integrity; bars re-aging (moving date of first delinquency later to keep items past the limit).
- Risk-Based Pricing Rule (CFPB + Fed): notify consumers given less favorable terms due to their report. All who use credit scores to make/arrange residential real-property loans must disclose the score to applicants.
- Employment use: clear stand-alone written notice → prior written authorization → certify (incl. no EEO violation) → give report copy + rights summary BEFORE adverse action; adverse-action notice follows after.
- Misconduct investigations are NOT consumer reports if employer follows procedures, uses no credit info, and gives a summary if adverse action taken.
- Investigative consumer report (character via interviews): written disclosure within 5 days of report request (FCRA §606) + notice of right to nature/scope.
- Medical info from CRAs restricted; credit/employment use needs specific written consent.
- Prescreened lists: set criteria in advance, retain 3 years from each offer, include required statement + opt-out.
FACTA Rules: Disposal + Red Flags
| Rule | Requirement | Enforcers / trap |
|---|---|---|
| Disposal Rule | Reasonable disposal of consumer-report info (shred/destroy) to prevent unauthorized access; all org sizes | FTC, banking regs, CFPB; overlaps GLBA Safeguards |
| Red Flags Rule | Written identity-theft detection program for financial institutions + creditors; no fixed checklist | Red Flag Program Clarification Act (2010) narrowed "creditor" - excludes those extending credit only for expenses incidental to a service (e.g., doctors/attorneys billing later) |
GLBA: Privacy Rule + Safeguards Rule
Title V of the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act; spurred by the U.S. Bancorp/MemberWorks scandal (bank shared account numbers with a telemarketer; $3M settlement). Covers financial institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities; regulates nonpublic personal information (NPI) - broad enough that even a customer's name is NPI. Penalties up to $100,000/violation (institutions); $10,000 (officers/directors).
- Consumer vs Customer
- GLBA protects consumers, but many duties (e.g., annual notice) apply only to customers with an ongoing relationship.
Privacy Rule: initial + annual notices; process opt-outs within 30 days; free sharing with affiliates + joint marketing partners; nonaffiliated sharing needs notice + opt-out.
GLBA prohibits sharing account numbers with nonaffiliated companies for telemarketing/direct marketing - even if the consumer hasn't opted out.
Safeguards Rule (effective 2003, FTC-updated 2021): written information security program with administrative, technical and physical safeguards, scaled to size/complexity. Requires a designated coordinator, written risk assessment, monitoring/testing, vendor oversight, and ongoing adjustment.
FAST Act Annual-Notice Exception (Dec 2015)
Amended GLBA §503: institution may skip the annual notice when both conditions hold - (1) sharing triggers no opt-out right, AND (2) privacy policy unchanged since last notice. Failing either restores the duty.
~9,000 accounts taken over; settlement barred GLBA Privacy + Safeguards violations for 20 years. Inadequate authentication → Safeguards Rule; no clear privacy notice → Privacy Rule.
State Financial Privacy
- California CFIPA (SB-1): requires written opt-in consent ("Important Privacy Choices for Consumers" form) to share with nonaffiliated third parties - stricter than GLBA's opt-out. Negligent: $2,500/consumer up to $500K cap; willful: no cap.
- NY NYDFS Cybersecurity Reg (2017): first state reg beyond GLBA - NIST-aligned, requires CISO, incident response, audit trails. Also BitLicense (2015) for virtual currency custody.
Only data specifically covered by GLBA or CFIPA is exempt - not the whole institution. A 2024 CCPA amendment also requires an acquirer in an M&A to honor opt-outs the consumer made to the seller.
AML / Bank Secrecy Act
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires an adequate AML program and timely Suspicious Activity Reports. Enforced by banking/financial-crime regulators - OCC + FinCEN, not the FCRA accuracy regulators.
$140M OCC + FinCEN penalty for willful BSA/AML failures (inadequate program + missed SARs).
Federal GLBA = opt-out; California CFIPA = opt-in. FACTA preempts; GLBA does not. FCRA has a private right of action; GLBA does not.
Education & Children's Privacy
Theme: who controls student records (FERPA), who controls children's online data (COPPA/FTC), and how HIPAA, IDEA, PPRA and state laws fit around them.
Major laws at a glance
| Law | What it does | Who enforces | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|---|
| FERPA (1974, "Buckley Amendment") | Controls disclosure of and access to student education records; incorporates FIPPs (notice, consent, access/correction, security, accountability) | Dept. of Education (FPCO); ultimate penalty = loss of federal funding | Applies only to schools that receive federal funding (K-12 AND universities). No private right of action; does NOT preempt stricter state law (floor, not ceiling) |
| PPRA (1978) | Amends FERPA; parents of minors get rights over surveys collecting sensitive info | Dept. of Education | K-12 only - does NOT apply to colleges/universities. Broadened by No Child Left Behind Act (2001): commercial-use policies, parental inspection, advance notice, opt-out for commercial-purpose data |
| IDEA | Guarantees eligible students aged 3-21 a free appropriate public education (FAPE) via an IEP; protects special-ed records | Dept. of Education | Protects records alongside FERPA; must destroy no-longer-needed disability info on request (except permanent records). Also covered by Rehabilitation Act of 1973 + ADA (1990) |
| COPPA | Limits collection/use of personal info from children under 13; FTC said in 2022 it would police edtech via COPPA | FTC + state attorneys general | Covers services directed to under-13s AND general-audience services with actual knowledge. Bars commercial use / excessive collection / over-retention |
| GLBA Safeguards Rule | Requires info-security program, risk assessments, service-provider oversight | (GLBA regime) | Universities holding financial aid info are treated as financial institutions and are covered |
| SOPIPA (California) | First U.S. law to ban using student data for noneducational targeted advertising | State | Became the template for other states' edtech laws; also requires reasonable security |
FERPA core definitions
- Student
- Anyone who is or has been in attendance (in-person OR internet). Excludes applicants who never enrolled - admission record becomes an education record only once the student matriculates.
- Education record
- Any record directly related to a student and maintained by/on behalf of the school (grades, financial aid, discipline; any medium incl. email).
- PII
- Name, family names, address, SSN/student number, DOB/place of birth, or anything that alone or combined identifies the student with reasonable certainty.
- Directory information
- Info not generally harmful if disclosed; each school defines its own list (name, DOB, address, email, phone, field of study, honors).
Records that are NOT education records
- Campus police records (held for law-enforcement purposes)
- Employment records (where employee is not a student)
- Applicant records (not enrolled)
- Alumni records (created after no longer a student)
- Peer-graded papers before collected/recorded by faculty
- Treatment records (health records, subject to conditions)
Campus police records are excluded only while held for law enforcement. Once shared with other campus administrators (e.g. dean for discipline), they become education records.
Opt-out vs opt-in (classic trap)
FERPA (like HIPAA) requires opt-in consent for most personal info, but directory information is opt-out - school must give students a chance to opt out before releasing. SSNs and student ID numbers cannot be directory information (a student ID may qualify only if it cannot access records without a second factor).
Who holds FERPA rights
| Situation | Rights holder |
|---|---|
| High school student under 18 | Parent |
| High schooler turns 18 | Rights transfer to student |
| Dual-enrolled (HS + college) | High school rules apply (parent) |
| Attending only a college/university | Student, regardless of age |
| Student is a tax dependent | School may disclose to parents without student consent |
When disclosure is permitted
- Info is not PII
- It is unblocked directory information
- The rights holder consents
- Disclosure goes to the rights holder
- A statutory exception applies
Nondirectory PII - GPA, grades, transcripts - may NOT be released without valid consent. There is no "employer" exception.
Valid consent must be signed, dated, and written, identifying the records, the purpose, and the recipient. To use a statutory exception only one exception must apply, but the school must use reasonable methods to verify identity.
Key no-consent exceptions
- School officials with a legitimate educational interest (need not be academic) - includes third-party vendors under the school's direct control; vendor cannot redisclose or reuse the record for any other purpose (e.g. marketing)
- Transfer/enrollment schools; financial aid; research studies; accrediting orgs
- Victims of sex offenses; sex-offender registry info
- Court orders / subpoenas - reasonable effort to notify the student first, unless nondisclosure is ordered
- Health or safety emergency - threat must be articulable and significant; school is safe if there was a rational basis at the time
Access & correction
- Access within 45 days of request (verify identity; cannot see others' portions, waived recommendation letters, parents' financials, treatment records, privileged info)
- May seek correction of inaccurate/misleading records; if denied, right to a hearing by a party with no direct interest; if still denied, student may place a written statement in the file (maintained and disclosed with the record)
FERPA vs HIPAA for health records
| Setting | Governing law |
|---|---|
| Public K-12 nurse / health records | FERPA (HIPAA Privacy Rule exempts FERPA-covered schools) |
| Private K-12, no federal funding, is a HIPAA covered entity | HIPAA (FERPA does not apply) |
| University clinic treating only students | FERPA (education/treatment records) |
| University clinic treating students + nonstudents | FERPA for student records; HIPAA for nonstudent records |
Edtech, COPPA & self-regulation
- Edtech handling student data is subject to FERPA. 2014 Google Apps for Education suit (EPIC alleged FERPA violations over email scanning) prompted 2014 Dept. of Education guidance: assess case by case whether edtech partners use FERPA-protected data.
- Student Privacy Pledge (2014; 400+ signatories by 2020): bars selling student data, behavioral ad targeting, non-educational profiling. Violation = deceptive trade practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Requires opt-in, express, verifiable parental consent specifically for targeted advertising; limits retention; expands "personal information" to cover biometric and government-issued identifiers; encourages age verification beyond self-declaration. 365 days to comply.
$520M total = $275M COPPA penalty (largest to date) + $245M refunds for dark patterns that tricked players into unwanted purchases.
Cybersecurity in education
- FERPA: requires reasonable security but specifies no particular controls; breaches not explicitly addressed but can trigger DoE investigation
- GLBA Safeguards Rule: covers universities holding financial aid info
- NY Education Law 2-D: districts must adopt cybersecurity policies aligned to the NIST Framework; California SOPIPA: reasonable security for student data; all 50 states have breach-notification laws
FERPA = federal funding + Dept. of Education + no private right + no preemption. PPRA = K-12 only. COPPA = under 13 + FTC. IDEA = ages 3-21.
Telecommunications & Marketing
Two coordinated federal regimes govern telemarketing - the FCC enforces the TCPA and the FTC enforces the TSR. Plus email (CAN-SPAM), faxes (JFPA), platform immunity (CDA 230), and FCC telecom breach rules.
Neither the TSR nor the FCC/TCPA rules preempt state law. Comply with federal rules AND stricter state law. (Contrast: CAN-SPAM DOES preempt most state email laws, except those barring false/deceptive activity.)
Major laws at a glance
| Law | What it does | Who enforces | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|---|
| TCPA (1991) | Restricts unsolicited calls, faxes, robocalls, texts (robotexts) | FCC | Does NOT preempt state law; private right of action; up to $500/fax |
| TSR (1995, amended 2003/08/10/15) | Telemarketing Sales Rule - call conduct, disclosures, DNC, billing | FTC + state AGs | Implements the Telemarketing & Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act; no preemption |
| Junk Fax Prevention Act (2005) | Amends TCPA; allows EBR-based commercial faxes if sender offers opt-out | FCC | Consent can be inferred from EBR; up to $500/fax |
| CAN-SPAM (2003) | Commercial email "rules of the road" on an opt-out basis | FTC (+ federal regulators, state AGs) | No general private right of action; preempts most state email law; up to $50,120/violation |
| CDA Section 230 (1996) | Platforms not treated as publisher of user content - immunity | (civil immunity) | Title V of Telecom Act; (c)(2) Good Samaritan protects good-faith moderation |
| TAKE IT DOWN Act (2025) | Criminalizes nonconsensual intimate imagery, incl. AI deepfakes | (criminal) | Doesn't amend 230 but creates exception; platforms must remove on notice |
| FCC 2023 breach rules (Dec 2023) | Telecom data breach notification | FCC | Covers carriers, interconnected VoIP, relay services; breach now includes inadvertent access/use/disclosure |
TSR call conduct rules
- Call only between 8 a.m. and 9 p.m.
- Scrub against the national DNC Registry; display accurate caller ID; identify self + what is sold; disclose material terms; retain records (2 years)
- Entity-specific suppression list: must honor any "don't call me again" request to that company - independent of the national registry
Required opening disclosures
Before any sales content, disclose: (1) seller's identity, (2) that the purpose is to sell, (3) nature of goods/services, (4) for prizes, that no purchase/payment is necessary. Must be truthful.
Required whenever a sales pitch is planned (even if conditioned on satisfaction). NOT required for a genuine satisfaction call with no plan to sell - even if the customer asks about other products.
Misrepresentations & billing
- 10 material categories must be disclosed (cost, restrictions, performance, refund policy, prize/investment terms, affiliations, credit card loss protection, negative option features, debt relief)
- Non-card payment (phone/utility billing) needs express verifiable authorization (higher standard - lacks card protections)
- No billing without express informed consent. Pre-acquired account + free-to-pay conversion = strictest rules: last 4 digits + express agreement + audio recording of entire transaction
Call abandonment safe harbor
Abandoned = no live rep within 2 seconds of the greeting (predictive dialers cause this). Prerecorded sales messages violate the TSR unless prior express consent (opt-in).
Safe harbor (all 4): abandon ≤3% of live-answered calls per day, per campaign; ring 15 sec / 4 rings; recorded ID message; keep records. Cannot blend abandonment rates across simultaneous campaigns.
National DNC Registry (eff. 2003)
- Access before calling; update lists every 31 days. Each seller gets a non-transferable SAN (telemarketer may use a client's SAN free, limited to paid area codes)
- Trap: failing to check the registry is a violation even if the number called is NOT listed
| DNC exception | Detail |
|---|---|
| Nonprofits | Calling on their own behalf (but for-profit telefunders ARE covered) |
| Customer EBR | 18 months from last purchase/transaction |
| Prospect EBR | 3 months from inquiry/application |
| Inbound calls | If no upsell |
| B2B | Most business-to-business calls |
- Consent exception: must be in writing, state the number, include signature (e-sig OK), clear & conspicuous (no prechecked boxes; subterfuge invalid)
- DNC Safe Harbor: shields a good-faith error if firm has written procedures, trains staff, keeps entity-specific list, uses registry data ≤31 days old, monitors compliance. Deliberately ignoring a no-call request is not "error."
TCPA robocall / autodialer updates
- 2012 FCC: prior express written consent for all robocalls to residential lines - even with an EBR; opt-out during the call; HIPAA health-care robocalls exempt
- 2015: robotexts get same protection as voice; consent disclosure must be clear/conspicuous; can't condition consent on a purchase
- 2017: reassigned number - not liable for the first call, liable after notice; appearing in someone's contacts ≠ consent; consent revocable any reasonable way
- Facebook v. Duguid (2021): autodialer = only equipment using a random or sequential number generator to store/produce numbers (narrowed definition)
Enforcement & penalties
- TSR/DNC civil penalties up to $50,120 per call/violation (FTC + state AGs)
- TSR private right of action requires $50,000 in actual damages
- TransUnion v. Ramirez (2021): plaintiff must show actual harm, not mere risk, for standing
- Mini-TCPAs: over half of states require licensing/registration; e.g. Louisiana limits EBR to 6 months. 2021 FCC record $225M robocall fine
CAN-SPAM email rules (opt-out)
- No false headers / deceptive subject lines; working return address; clear cost-free opt-out honored within 10 business days; valid physical postal address (P.O. box OK); no aggravated violations (harvesting, dictionary attacks)
- Applies to commercial messages, NOT transactional/relationship messages (order confirmations, warranty/safety, employment info)
- ISPs adversely affected may sue (up to $250/violation, max $2M, trebled for willful)
FCC CAN-SPAM wireless rules require express prior authorization (opt-in) for each MSCM (commercial email to a wireless device via internet domain). No third-party/affiliate sending - each entity gets its own consent. Check the Wireless Domain Registry; carriers report domains within 30 days; covers SMS-tech but not phone-to-phone.
Fax marketing notes
- 2019 FCC: online cloud-based fax services (faxes as email) fall outside TCPA/JFPA - not "telephone facsimile machines"
- California's bid to kill the EBR exception for interstate faxes struck down - TCPA preempts interstate fax regulation
- Enforcement: $12M Hooters award (2001); $5.4M Fax.com FCC fine (2004)
8-to-9 (call hours) - 2 seconds (abandonment) - 3% (safe harbor) - 31 days (refresh DNC) - 18mo customer / 3mo prospect (EBR) - 10 business days (opt-out) - 2 years (records) - $50,000 (private suit) / $50,120 (per-call penalty).
Workplace Privacy
The U.S. has no comprehensive employment-privacy law. The default is employment at will and broad employer discretion; privacy protections are narrow exceptions from sectoral federal laws, state contract/tort law, and a state-by-state statutory patchwork. EU folds employee privacy into general data-protection rules (monitoring needs specific legal justification).
Constitutional law and the state-action limit
- Fourth Amendment (limits searches of lockers/desks) applies to government (public-sector) employers only - private employers have no state action.
- Exception: a few states (notably California) extend their state constitutional privacy right to private-sector employees.
State contract and common-law torts
- Contract: Collective bargaining agreements are the most important contracts for employee privacy (often limit drug testing/monitoring). If privacy is to be protected, the task falls largely to legislatures.
| Tort | Core test | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Intrusion upon seclusion | Intentional intrusion highly offensive to reasonable person | Camera in restroom/changing room; secret wiretap |
| Publicity given to private life | Broad dissemination of private matter, not of public concern | Spreading private info (1st Amend. may defend) |
| Defamation | False, reputation-harming statement | False drug-test report; incorrect reference |
An announced policy that company computers are employer-owned and monitored often defeats the claim.
Federal laws affecting employment privacy
| Law | What it does |
|---|---|
| HIPAA | Privacy/security rules for protected health info (incl. self-funded plans) |
| COBRA | Continued health coverage after termination |
| ERISA | Fair creation/administration of benefits programs |
| FMLA | Unpaid leave for birth/illness of self or family |
| FCRA | Regulates consumer reports (background/reference checks) |
| FLSA | Minimum wage and fair-pay standards |
| OSHA | Workplace safety |
| NLRA | Collective bargaining; also reaches social-media speech |
| IRCA | Employment eligibility verification |
| Whistleblower Protection Act | Protects federal employees/applicants from retaliation |
| Securities Exchange Act 1934 | Senior-exec pay disclosures; broker-dealer registration |
Stems swap these: HIPAA=health info, COBRA=continued coverage, ERISA=benefits administration, FMLA=unpaid leave.
Who enforces what
| Agency | Key laws / role |
|---|---|
| DOL | FLSA, OSHA, ERISA; also enforces the EPPA |
| EEOC | Title VII, ADEA, ADA (Titles I & V); workplace discrimination |
| FTC and CFPB | Unfair/deceptive practices; FCRA |
| NLRB | Administers NLRA; runs union elections; unfair-labor-practice remedies |
Employment life cycle
- Before: background screening (FCRA).
- During: polygraphs/testing, monitoring, social media, BYOD.
- After: access termination, HR records.
- HR-related privacy is a risk for virtually all organizations, even non-data-heavy ones.
Antidiscrimination limits on screening
| Law | Protected basis |
|---|---|
| Title VII (1964) | Race, color, religion, sex, national origin (EEOC extends to sexual orientation & gender identity) |
| Equal Pay Act (1963) | Wage disparity by sex |
| ADEA (1967) | Age (over 40) |
| Pregnancy Discrimination Act (1978) | Pregnancy, childbirth, related conditions |
| ADA (1990) | Disability (qualified individuals) |
| GINA (2008) | Genetic information |
| Bankruptcy Act 11 U.S.C. 525(b) | Bankruptcy filers (courts split on pre-offer) |
- Reduce risk: avoid eliciting protected-class info; ask all candidates the same questions.
- Protected info allowed when required by statute, a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), or learned for another nondiscriminatory reason.
- EEOC: screening (e.g., criminal-conviction bars) must be job-related and consistent with business necessity or risks disparate-impact claims.
ADA medical screening
- Covers employers with 15+ employees.
- Pre-offer: exams/inquiries only if job-related & business necessity; cannot ask if accommodation needed (unless disability known).
- Post-conditional-offer: exam OK if all entering employees examined, results kept confidential, used per statute.
- Must provide reasonable accommodation unless undue hardship.
- Psychological tests may count as medical exams. ADA excludes current illegal drug use but protects recovered addicts and qualified alcoholics.
FCRA background checks
- Covers any check from a CRA - not just credit, but criminal and driving records too.
- Need a permissible purpose ("employment purposes" = screening + promotion/reassignment/retention).
- Steps: written notice (indicate if investigative consumer report - info from neighbors/associates), written consent, certify to CRA, pre-adverse-action notice with report copy, then adverse-action notice.
- Noncompliance: civil + criminal penalties and a private right of action. FTC pursues nontraditional CRAs (online data brokers).
FACTA preemption & state credit laws
- FACTA (2003) amended FCRA and preempted many state credit-reporting/identity-theft laws, but does NOT preempt stronger state employment credit-check laws.
- California ICRAA: notice + written authorization first; box to receive report copy; report given before adverse action.
- 10 more states (CO, CT, DE, HI, IL, MD, NV, OR, VT, WA) limit credit use; most require a substantial relationship, Hawaii requires "directly relate" (strictest).
Fair Chance Act & Ban the Box
- Fair Chance to Compete on Jobs Act (2019): bars federal agencies and federal contractors from asking criminal history until a conditional offer.
- Part of Ban the Box movement (~two-thirds of states, 150+ municipalities; many reach private employers).
Screening tech: social media & AI
- Social-media screening risks: discrimination (protected-class info), FCRA (nontraditional providers), invasion of privacy via social engineering (fake profiles).
- Maryland first (2012) to ban demanding social-network passwords; ~half the states followed.
Automated Employment Decision Tools (AI scoring hiring/promotion). NYC Local Law 144 = three duties: (1) bias audit, (2) publish results, (3) notify candidates (and of any alternative process).
Polygraphs - EPPA
- EPPA (1988), enforced by DOL: bars most private employers from using lie detectors on workers/applicants; no adverse action for refusing.
- Exceptions: gov't, security services, controlled-substance mfg, defense contractors, national security; plus ongoing-investigation of economic loss with reasonable suspicion. Cannot discharge on polygraph alone.
- Does NOT preempt stricter state laws. Must post provisions conspicuously.
Substance testing
- No federal privacy statute directly governs employer drug/alcohol testing (public employees: 4th Amend.).
- ADA: drug test is not a medical exam; current illegal drug use excluded; qualified alcoholic protected.
- Settings: preemployment, reasonable-suspicion, routine (notice at hire), post-accident, random (narrow regulated/safety jobs).
Federal law mandates testing for safety-sensitive roles (aviation, rail, trucking) and preempts contrary state law. Cannabis is federally prohibited, so these employees follow federal rules even in legalizing states; fewer than half of legalizing states protect positive-testing employees.
Lifestyle discrimination
- Off-duty conduct generally private. Obesity from a physiological disability may be ADA-covered (courts split).
- No federal law protects smokers; more than half the states protect off-duty/off-premises smoking.
Monitoring baseline
- U.S. private employees have limited privacy expectations - facilities/equipment belong to employer.
- Acceptable use policies + monitoring notices establish knowledge and defeat improper-monitoring claims; may be required by state law.
- Reasons to monitor: OSHA safety, quality (recorded calls - pause for full payment-card data), avoiding negligent supervision, physical security (CCTV/GPS), cybersecurity, trade secrets.
Intercepting communications - Wiretap Act / ECPA
- Wiretap Act & ECPA prohibit intercepting wire/oral/electronic communications (criminal + private right of action).
- Two exceptions: consent (one party) and ordinary course of business (courts split on breadth).
- Listening to a purely personal call risks liability. States vary: one-party vs all-party consent to record.
Stored Communications Act - City of Ontario v. Quon
- SCA bars unauthorized access to stored communications; exceptions for the service provider (often employer) and authorized user. Employers may review for reasonable, work-related reasons.
Supreme Court allowed an employer to review an employee's texts to check policy compliance (employer provided the pager). Caution: employer was public, so the 4th Amendment applied - does not carry over to private employers. ECPA does NOT preempt stricter state laws.
Biometric, video, mail & union speech
| State biometric law | Key feature |
|---|---|
| Illinois BIPA | Notice + informed consent; private right of action (drives class actions) |
| Texas | Covers employers; no private right of action |
| Washington | Covers employers; no private right of action |
- Federal wiretap/stored-record statutes do not reach silent video; state/common law bar cameras in restrooms/locker/changing areas.
- Mail is "delivered" when it reaches a business - opening business mail doesn't violate the federal statute (some state common-law risk).
- NLRB: employee social-media speech complaining about managers/coworkers/company may be protected.
Timeclock vendor Kronos was held liable under Illinois BIPA for fingerprint timeclocks deployed without consent - settled $15.28M (~$290-$580/class member). Lesson: a biometric-device vendor can face direct BIPA liability; get explicit consent first.
LBS, DLP, BYOD, teleworking
- LBS: GPS on company vehicles generally OK (business purpose, work hours, prior notice); tracking employees themselves is limited - Connecticut requires written notice ($500 first-offense); California makes electronic location-tracking a misdemeanor.
- DLP: keystroke logging/webcams/geolocation - very invasive; do a privacy impact assessment.
- BYOD: work-device monitoring may be inappropriate on personal devices; disclose and consider consent. COIT = consumer tech now drives into the workplace.
- Teleworking: secure home networks, lock screens, shred papers, household members on video.
Investigating misconduct - Vail Letter & FACTA fix
- Vail Letter (FTC): made an outside investigator a CRA and its report an investigative consumer report - FCRA notice/consent destroyed undercover investigations.
- FACTA fix: excludes investigation communications from "consumer report" if (1) to investigate suspected misconduct/legal-policy compliance, (2) not for creditworthiness, (3) shared only with limited recipients. No advance notice needed; only a summary after adverse action (preserves secrecy).
After employment
- Terminate access (badges, accounts, devices); recover data; forward personal mail, review work mail; avoid shared passwords.
- References risk defamation, but common-law qualified privilege protects good-faith reports. No common-law duty to give a reference (some state statutes require for specific jobs, e.g., airline pilot, public-school teacher).
- HR record retention: consistent policies balancing legitimate need vs privacy.
Government & Court Access to Data
For any request, ask: is disclosure required, permitted, or forbidden? The same statute can do all three depending on the circumstances (e.g. produce with a court order, prohibit without one). Turning over too much or too little can both create liability.
Required vs Permitted vs Forbidden
| Posture | Examples |
|---|---|
| Required | FDA adverse-event reporting; OSHA injury reporting; state abuse/gunshot/disease reporting; subpoena under FRCP 45 (enforced by contempt). HIPAA permits PHI disclosure where "required by law." |
| Permitted (not required) | HIPAA requires very few disclosures (only to the individual and to HHS in enforcement) but permits many (public health, law enforcement, national security). PATRIOT Act computer trespasser exception (Sec. 217) lets a system owner voluntarily authorize interception of an intruder. |
| Forbidden | Opt-in/opt-out laws + evidentiary privileges (see below). |
HIPAA and COPPA = opt-in (no consent, no sharing). GLBA = opt-out (sharing allowed unless person says stop). Breaking an opt-out promise can trigger FTC Act Section 5 enforcement.
After Roe was overturned, HHS Office for Civil Rights clarified a covered entity is not permitted to disclose PHI as "required by law" where state law does not expressly require reporting - but is permitted to disclose via court order or court-ordered warrant.
Escalating legal standards (least → most demanding)
| Tool | Standard |
|---|---|
| Pen register / trap-and-trace order | Information relevant to an ongoing investigation |
| 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) order (stored content) | Specific and articulable facts = reasonable grounds records relevant to a criminal investigation |
| Search warrant | Probable cause a crime has been/is/will be committed (neutral magistrate) |
| Telephone wiretap | Probable-cause warrant PLUS extra showings (e.g. alternative means exhausted) |
Evidentiary privileges (forbid disclosure)
- Generally defined under state law: attorney-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, spousal.
- Attorney-client: bars compelling attorney testimony about a client within scope of representation; exceptions = client consent or preventing imminent physical harm.
- Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination applies nationally.
Public records, protective orders, redaction
- Strong U.S. tradition of open courts + FOIA/state open-records laws. Putting records online ended practical obscurity, raising identity-fraud risk.
- Protective order (FRCP 26(c)): needs good cause; three-part test - (1) resisting party shows info confidential, (2) requester shows relevant/necessary, (3) court weighs harm vs need.
- HIPAA qualified protective order (QPO): used in state courts outside Federal Rules; bars non-litigation use + requires return/destruction of PHI at end.
| FRCP 5.2 (2007) - max in civil filing | What may remain |
|---|---|
| SSN / taxpayer ID | Last 4 digits only |
| Date of birth | Year only |
| Minor's name | Initials only |
| Financial account number | Last 4 digits only |
Criminal Rule 49.1 and Bankruptcy Rule 9037 mirror 5.2. In criminal filings a 5th category applies: only city and state of a home address.
E-discovery and ESI
- Since the 2006 FRCP revisions, ESI (email, databases, logs, IM, voicemail, social media, removable media) drives pretrial discovery. Sedona Conference = leading source of retention best practices.
- Litigation hold: once on notice of (anticipated) litigation, suspend routine destruction. Discovery obligations generally prevail over conflicting business practices.
- Retention-policy dispute = 3-factor test: (1) policy reasonable on facts, (2) similar complaints against org, (3) policy adopted in bad faith.
Discovery under HIPAA and GLBA
- HIPAA: disclose PHI in discovery via (1) patient authorization, (2) court order, or (3) satisfactory assurances = agreed QPO submitted, or requester asked court for one.
- GLBA: may disclose to comply with legal process / respond to judicial process; courts read this to cover civil discovery - but still get a protective order.
Cross-border discovery
- Broad U.S. discovery (possession, custody, or control - globally) collides with foreign law like the GDPR. Supreme Court: foreign statutes don't strip a U.S. court of power to order production. Some courts require a privacy log.
- Hague Evidence Convention: alternative route; party invoking it bears the burden of showing it's more appropriate and that foreign law prohibits discovery - slow, costly, last resort.
- Aerospatiale factors: importance, specificity, U.S. origin of data, alternative means, and competing national interests (the MOST important factor).
Fourth Amendment
Bars unreasonable searches; warrants need probable cause, particularity, neutral magistrate. Exclusionary rule suppresses unlawfully obtained evidence.
| Case (year) | Holding |
|---|---|
| Olmstead (1928) | No warrant for wiretaps outside building (later overruled); Brandeis dissent "right to be let alone" |
| Katz (1967) | Overruled Olmstead; warrant for phone-booth bug; created reasonable expectation of privacy test (subjective + society recognizes) |
| Jones (2012) | Warrant for month-long GPS tracking (trespass theory) |
| Riley (2014) | Warrant to search cellphone contents (quantitatively + qualitatively different from container) |
| Carpenter (2018) | Warrant for cell site location info; narrowed third-party doctrine |
Info voluntarily given to a bank/phone company loses 4th Amendment protection, so companies are generally constitutionally permitted to turn over customer records - BUT statutes (RFPA, ECPA) may still restrict it. Carpenter narrowed this for CSLI. (Smith v. Maryland: dialed numbers NOT protected.)
Emerging issues
- Post-Dobbs / abortion data: an anti-abortion state may send a warrant to a company in another state. California bars compliance with other states' abortion warrants = interstate conflict of law (possible Supreme Court case).
- Geofence warrants: challenged as unconstitutional general warrants; lower courts split; Supreme Court has not ruled.
Statutes beyond the 4th Amendment
Congress added process where the Constitution didn't reach. These require some legal process but less than a probable-cause warrant.
| Law (year) | What it does | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|
| RFPA (1978) | Customer authorization or specific legal process before federal access to financial records of individuals/small partnerships | Applies only to federal requests; only individuals + partnerships of fewer than 5; advance notice + right to challenge; actual + punitive damages, attorney's fees |
| ECPA / Wiretap Act (Title III) (1986/1968) | Bars interception of communications; ECPA extends to electronic comms (email) | Real-time interception treated more strictly than stored records; criminal + private right of action |
| SCA (part of ECPA, 1986) | Bars unauthorized access to comms in electronic storage | Simpler exceptions: provider-authorized + user-authorized; does NOT preempt stricter state law (DE, CT require monitoring notice) |
| PPA (1980) | Shields media work product from government search/seizure in criminal investigations (forces use of subpoena) | After Zurcher v. Stanford Daily; all gov't levels; criminal only; $1,000 minimum + damages + fees. No protection if reporter committed crime - unless the only crime is possessing/communicating the work product |
| CALEA (1994) | Requires telecom carriers to build lawful-interception capability into products | FCC (2005) extended to broadband + VoIP interconnecting with phone service |
| CLOUD Act (2018) | Part 1: U.S. orders reach data regardless of where stored. Part 2: qualifying foreign gov'ts go directly to U.S. providers via executive agreement | Part 1 mooted U.S. v. Microsoft (Ireland); Part 2 bypasses slow MLAT (~10 months, needs U.S. probable cause) for non-U.S. persons; agreements only for human-rights/rule-of-law countries (UK, Australia) |
Federal law = one-party consent. Many states require all-party consent ("this call may be recorded"). Federal law is NOT preemptive, so recording can violate a stricter state law. Ordinary course of business exception: covers routine call-center monitoring/malware scanning with provider equipment; listening to a purely personal call risks violating wiretap laws.
HIPAA law-enforcement disclosure (Sec. 512(f))
Permits disclosure via court order, grand jury subpoena, or administrative request if all three: (1) relevant and material to a legitimate inquiry; (2) request specific and limited in scope; (3) deidentified info could not reasonably be used.
Preservation, pen register / trap-and-trace
- SCA preservation order: on government request, provider must preserve records pending a court order (like a litigation hold).
- Pen register (outgoing) / trap-and-trace (incoming) issue on lenient "relevant to an ongoing investigation" standard. PATRIOT Act expanded scope to "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling info." USA FREEDOM Act barred bulk collection - requires specific selectors.
CISA - cyber threat sharing
- Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (2015): companies voluntarily share cyber threat indicators + defensive measures with the government for liability protection. DHS is main coordinator; indicator definition excludes sensitive personal/business info.
- Must first remove personal info not directly related to a threat. Sharing with federal gov't doesn't waive privileges - NO similar protection for state/local or other companies. Info exempt from FOIA. Protected from liability for monitoring (NOT for operating defensive measures).
- Officially sunset Sept 30, 2025 (Congress missed reauthorization), then extended to Jan 30, 2026; long-term future uncertain.
Budapest Convention
2004 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (first cybercrime treaty, 60+ countries). Second Additional Protocol (U.S. signed 2022): expedited production, direct disclosure of subscriber/domain info, emergency requests, with data-protection safeguards.
National security surveillance
Tension: Article II (president, foreign affairs) vs Article III (courts). Katz reserved the national security question.
| Authority | Key point |
|---|---|
| FISA (1978) / FISC | Orders on probable cause target is a foreign power or agent (not probable cause of a crime), when foreign intelligence is a significant purpose. USA FREEDOM Act added amicus curiae of privacy experts |
| Section 702 (FISA Amendments Act 2008) | Targets non-U.S. persons reasonably believed outside the U.S.; can collect full content. Programs: PRISM (directives to U.S. providers for selectors) and Upstream (filters internet backbone). FISC approves certifications annually |
| Section 215 (PATRIOT Act) | Bulk call-detail-record collection; bulk collection ended by USA FREEDOM Act; provision expired 2020 |
| National Security Letter (NSL) | FBI subpoena issued without judicial involvement for records relevant to terrorism/intelligence. PATRIOT Act expanded to tens of thousands/yr. Recipients can petition court to modify/set aside; may disclose to those needed to comply + an attorney; secrecy presumptively terminated when investigation closes or within 3 years. Breach: up to 5 yrs prison, $250,000 fine |
- Snowden (2013) reforms: USA FREEDOM Act (2015) ended Section 215 bulk collection; Judicial Redress Act (2016) extended Privacy Act protections to certain non-U.S. persons; PCLOB reviewed the programs.
- National security exceptions vary: HIPAA permits disclosure to authorized federal officials (National Security Act); GLBA has a vaguer public-safety exception; COPPA has NO national security exception.
GDPR & International Privacy
Scope, Sanctions, and Core Concepts
The GDPR (2018) is the worldwide template for data protection, built on fair information practices (FIPs). It applies to companies with assets/employees in the EU, companies selling to individuals in the EU, and data stored in the EU - no EU establishment needed.
GDPR introduced: (1) processing requirements, (2) individual rights, (3) breach notification, (4) DPO designation, (5) sanctions up to 4% of worldwide revenue, (6) international transfer rules. Headline max fine = 4% of worldwide revenue.
- Personal data
- Any data relating to an identified/identifiable natural person, directly or indirectly.
- Sensitive (special-category) data
- Race/ethnicity, political opinions, religious/philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic, biometric, health, sex life/orientation - generally needs explicit consent.
- Anonymized
- Irreversibly de-identified - only then outside GDPR scope.
- Pseudonymized
- De-identified but reversible - still personal data.
Under GDPR, an IP address and cookie ID ARE personal data - even though often not PII in the U.S. Encrypted/pseudonymized data is still personal data if reidentifiable. NOT personal data: company registration number, generic role emails (support@), anonymized data.
Roles
| Role | Definition / key point |
|---|---|
| Controller | Determines purposes and means; bears more legal responsibility; appoints DPO, runs DPIAs. |
| Processor | Processes on controller's behalf, per contract/instructions. |
| Subprocessor | Subcontractor of a processor; GDPR requirements flow downstream to it. |
| Data subject | The natural person whose data is processed. |
Consent
Must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous - by statement or clear affirmative action. Silence, pre-ticked boxes, and inactivity fail. Business bears the burden to demonstrate consent was obtained.
DPA, DPO, and EU Representative
- DPA: independent national authority enforcing the law - one per member state except Germany (federal + 16 Lander).
- DPO: in-EU internal point of contact; needs expertise and no conflicts of interest (cannot also set processing purposes). Need is triggered by EU data subjects, large-scale monitoring, or large-scale sensitive processing - not by controller-vs-processor status.
- EU representative: appointed by a company with no physical EU presence; subject to GDPR enforcement.
Seven Principles
- Lawfulness, fairness, transparency
- Purpose limitation (research/archiving/statistics not "incompatible")
- Data minimization
- Accuracy
- Storage limitation
- Integrity and confidentiality (security)
- Accountability - meta-principle: must demonstrate compliance with the other six (via records, DPIAs, breach documentation).
Data Subject Rights
| Right | Key point / trap |
|---|---|
| Be informed | Drives privacy notices (layered, just-in-time, dashboards); if not collected directly, must reveal the source. |
| Access (SAR) | Confirmation + copy + processing info; gateway to other rights. |
| Rectification | Correct inaccurate / complete incomplete data. |
| Erasure (right to be forgotten) | Defined grounds; reaches backups and downstream controllers (unless exemption, e.g. legal claims). |
| Restriction | Mark data to limit future use (alternative to erasure, e.g. while accuracy contested). |
| Portability | Only data subject provided, where processing is by consent or contract AND automated; structured machine-readable format. |
| Object | Absolute for direct marketing (incl. profiling). Public-interest / legitimate-interest objections are qualified - controller can refuse on compelling overriding grounds. |
| Automated decision-making | General prohibition on fully automated decisions with legal/significant effect. Exceptions: necessary for contract, authorized by law, or explicit consent. |
Respond within one month (extendable to three). Generally no fee, but may charge for manifestly unfounded or excessive requests or extra copies. Communicate rectification/erasure/restriction to each recipient.
Breach Notification
| Who notifies | Recipient | Timing / trigger |
|---|---|---|
| Controller | DPA | Within 72 hours of becoming aware, where feasible; explain any delay |
| Processor | Controller | Without undue delay |
| Controller | Data subjects | Without undue delay when breach = high risk |
GDPR breach concept is broader than U.S. law. No DPA notice if unlikely to risk individuals (but still document it). No subject notice if data protected (encrypted), harm prevented, or notice disproportionate.
Enforcement and Fines
Complaint by data subject or DPA; multi-DPA cases get a lead DPA. If DPA gives no outcome/progress in three months, subject may go to national court. Controllers AND processors can be liable to data subjects; in the same processing each is liable for the entire damage, then seeks contribution (exempt only if not in any way responsible).
| Tier | Maximum | Targets |
|---|---|---|
| Higher-level | Greater of €20M or 4% global revenue | Basic processing principles, consent conditions, special-category data, data subject rights, transfers |
| Lower-level | Greater of €10M or 2% global revenue | Data protection by default/design, records, DPA cooperation, security, breach notification, DPO designation |
Member states may also impose criminal sanctions. Notable fines: Instagram €405M (children), Facebook €265M (scraping), Amazon €746M (cookie consent).
International Transfers
Transfers from the EEA (EU + Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland) to non-EEA countries are prohibited unless one applies: adequacy decision, appropriate safeguard, or derogation.
- Adequacy decision: protections essentially equivalent to GDPR; data flows freely; subject to periodic review. Adequate: Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Israel, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, UK, US (via DPF), Uruguay.
- SCCs (standard contractual clauses): contract to comply with EU law + submit to DPA supervision - most common basis.
- BCRs (binding corporate rules): intra-group transfers after DPA certification.
- Derogations: narrow exceptions (explicit consent; occasional contract/legal-claims/vital-interest/public-interest). Read narrowly - only as strictly necessary; not for routine bulk transfers.
EU-U.S. Transfers: Schrems and the DPF
| Case / framework | Year | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Schrems I (CJEU) | 2015 | Struck down Safe Harbor (U.S. surveillance, post-Snowden) |
| Schrems II (CJEU) | 2020 | Struck down Privacy Shield (no redress/proportionality); applies to all third countries (implicates China, fewer protections) |
| EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework | 2023 | Third agreement; backed by Executive Order 14086 (necessity + proportionality, independent data protection review court); EU issued U.S. adequacy decision; expected to be challenged |
Other Global Data-Flow Mechanisms
- Global CBPR Forum (2022): certification built on APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules but independent of APEC so non-members can join.
- OECD (2022): declaration on common principles for government access to private-sector data (legal basis, oversight, remedies, etc.).
Other high-yield exam points
Chapter 11 - Telecommunications and Marketing
| Law | What it does | Who enforces | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 222 (CPNI) | Restricts how telecom carriers access, use, and disclose Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) - call detail, services subscribed, billing/network data, call logs (time, date, destination, duration) | FCC | Name, phone number, and address are NOT CPNI. Carriers may use/disclose CPNI only with customer approval or as required by law |
| Communications Decency Act (CDA, 1996), Section 230 | An interactive computer service shall not be treated as the publisher or speaker of content provided by another party - immunizes platforms from liability for user-generated content; 230(c)(2) "Good Samaritan" protects good-faith removal of objectionable content | (immunity defense; courts) | "Interactive computer service" is the defined term that determines who is protected. A platform is NOT a publisher (unlike a newspaper). Title V of the Telecom Act of 1996 |
| Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act) | Governs cable providers' notice, collection, disclosure, retention of subscriber data; annual privacy notice; collect only necessary info; disclose only with written/electronic consent | FCC; private right of action (actual/statutory + punitive damages, attorneys' fees) | Does NOT cover cable broadband internet ("cable service" = one-way video/programming) |
| CalOPPA (2003) | California Online Privacy Protection Act - first U.S. law requiring commercial websites/apps to post a privacy notice if they collect PII from Californians; 2013 amendment added Do Not Track disclosure | California AG | First U.S. website/app privacy-notice mandate - applies to anyone collecting PII from California residents |
After U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC (1999, 10th Cir.) struck the FCC's 1998 opt-in rule as a violation of carriers' First Amendment speech rights, a carrier's own use of CPNI shifted to opt-out. The 2007 CPNI order requires opt-in before sharing CPNI with joint-venture partners/contractors and adds anti-pretexting rules (passwords, breach notice to law enforcement within seven business days).
- Pretexting
- Gaining access to CPNI through fraudulent means; combated by the 2007 order's password and breach-notice requirements.
Chapter 9 - Financial Privacy
| Law / concept | What it does | Who enforces | Key point / trap |
|---|---|---|---|
| EFTA (1978) + Regulation E | Electronic Fund Transfer Act sets consumer rights/company duties for electronic fund transfers (ATM, direct deposit, point-of-sale, debit card) | CFPB (rulemaking transferred 2011 under Dodd-Frank) | 2021 guidance: Reg E covers P2P payments like Zelle and Venmo; unauthorized EFTs are the institution's responsibility |
| Bank Secrecy Act (1970) - Currency Transaction Report (CTR) | CTR filed for currency transactions of $10,000 or more (reported to the IRS) | FinCEN (Treasury) | $10,000 is the CTR threshold - do not confuse with the SAR thresholds ($5,000+ with suspect, $25,000+ without) |
| Know Your Customer (KYC) | Requirements to identify customers and beneficial owners to deter money laundering | FinCEN | Expanded by the USA PATRIOT Act (International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act, 2001) |
| FATCA (2010) | Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act - targets U.S. taxpayers with foreign accounts; requires more detailed KYC documentation | IRS / Treasury | Focus = offshore tax evasion |
| AML Act of 2020 | Anti-Money Laundering Act - most comprehensive AML changes since the PATRIOT Act | FinCEN | Expanded the BSA to explicitly include virtual currencies |
| CFPB "abusive" standard (UDAAP) | CFPB can act against unfair, deceptive, AND abusive acts/practices | CFPB (created by Dodd-Frank, 2010) | "Abusive" is the extra prong CFPB adds beyond the FTC's unfair/deceptive - covers taking unreasonable advantage of a consumer's lack of understanding or reliance |
Chapter 8 - Medical Privacy
| Term | What it is | Key point |
|---|---|---|
| Health care clearinghouse | A third-party organization that hosts, handles, or processes medical information | One of the three HIPAA covered-entity types (with health care providers doing certain electronic transactions, and health plans) |
| Qualified Service Organization (QSO) | An entity that may receive patient-identifying information without consent for info it needs to provide services to the program | Under 42 CFR Part 2 (substance use disorder records); "patient-identifying information" = anything that could reasonably identify a person treated for substance abuse |
Chapter 1 - Introduction to Privacy
- OECD Collection Limitation Principle
- Personal data collection should be limited, obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with consent (one of the eight 1980 OECD principles).
- Madrid Resolution - Proportionality principle
- Processing limited to what is adequate, relevant, and not excessive for the purposes, with reasonable efforts to minimize (2009 standards approved by privacy commissioners, not governments).
- Choice and consent (a distinct FIP category)
- Organizations must describe available choices and obtain implicit or explicit consent for handling personal information.
Chapter 3 - Technological Aspects
- Threat modeling
- Identifying the most salient security risks for an organization (the "adversarial mindset"), using tools like MITRE ATT&CK and STRIDE.
STRIDE is the mnemonic (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege); threat modeling is the broader practice of finding salient risks, and MITRE ATT&CK is another tool used for it.
Chapter 14 - GDPR and International Privacy
- CJEU - Court of Justice of the European Union
- The court whose Schrems I (2015, struck Safe Harbor) and Schrems II (2020, struck Privacy Shield) decisions scrutinized U.S. surveillance of EU data.